N KARUPPANNAN Vs. ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) WHETHER the Pasteur Institute of Southern India, Coonoor, and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Madras, arc industries within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is the common question for decision in these otherwise unrelated matters. By an order dated May 22, 1970, the State Government declined to refer for adjudication the non-employment of one A. Jesudoss in the Institute, and certain demands raised by its work-men through the Institute Staff Union. The Government did so on the view that the institution could not be considered as an industry for the purposes of Section 2 (j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Staff Union unsuccesstully moved under Article 226 of the Constitution for a direction to the State Government to reconsider the question of making a reference. 'that is the subject-matter of the will appeal. The Additional Registered of Trade Unions, Madras, by an older dated July 24, 1973, cancelled the registration dated August 27. , 1973 as Trade Union of I he Madras Council of Scientific and Industrial Research Employees and Workers union. He was of the opinion that the CSIR Madras Complex a branch of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was not engaged in any trade or industry, but the complex was established for the purpose of assisting the Scientific and Industrial search, and that, therefore, the employees of tic Complex were not workmen within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 the union had appealed under Section 11 of the Trade Union. Act from that order. This appeal was directed to be treated as a petition to be dealt with in the original side of the Court. but later withdrawn and posted along with connected writ petition which is also by that union to direct the State Government to re-consider the question of making a. reference of certain items of disputes fur adjudication. Since the Government had earlier declined to make a reference on the view that the Complex was not an industry, but a department of Scientific Research and Service, the question we are called upon to resolve is eventually tied up with the fact relating to the character of each of these institutions. Hut in considering the problem, a basic, and general understanding of what is an industry for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Trade Unions Act is necessary for its appropriate application to the facts, it maybe taken that if the institutions we arc concerned with are not industries for the purposes of the Industrial Disputes Act, it will be so also for the purposes of the Trade Unions Act.

(2.) SECTION 2 (j) defines "industry'' as meaning "any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling service, -employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen". Simple as the definition may at first sight appear, its scope has proved lobe one of complexity in judicial thinking as evident from the decided cases. Divergence of opinion on that matter is more in the application of the definition rather than in the conception of industry as defined by the statute.

(3.) IN the abstract, the world -'industry" is capable of a much wider significance or import than when it is related and confined 10 any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers as is done by the first part of the definition in Section 2 (j ). The dominant element in the first part of the definition. as it appears to us, is the commercial character of productive activity resulting in goods service distinct from one of a professional nature. When the first part of the definition is so understood, the inclusive part, having regards to its intimate relation with the first part, is also highlighted by the commercial character of the activity involved in any calling, service, Employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. These different activities may have as their end to produce goods or material service which, understood In the context of the first part, involved the commercial sense. For instance, any calling for the inclusive part of Section 2 (j) may exclude a teacher engaged in mere instruction of pupils in an educational institution as in a law college or engineering college or even an industrial school. Service may not lake w thin its scope under Section 2 (j) the professional service of a lawyer or a doctor. But, when a teacher, or an engineer, or a lawyer or a doctor exerts by himself, or in working for an employer, produces or helps to produce goods or service of a commercial character as the motive and end of the enterprise, then, of course, it will be different and may well fall inside the inclusive part of the definition.