STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. INDIA PISTONS LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two tax revision cases relate to the assessment years 1965-66 and 1966-67. The assessing authority rejected the claim of the assessee in respect of two items of turnover which alone need be mentioned here. One item was the turnover relating to sales of iron scraps. The turnover in respect of this item for 1965-66 was Rs. 4, 91, 332.83 and for 1966-67 it was Rs. 6, 80, 138.20. The second claim related to the includibility in the taxable turnover of certain amount representing sales return and bonus discount granted to the customers. In respect of these two claims, the assessee preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the assessee is a manufacturer and seller of automobile ancillary parts, industrial engine parts, tractor and agricultural parts and electrical components of engines and the assessee was not a dealer in iron scraps. The sale of iron scraps was also not in the course of their business and that, therefore, the turnover representing the sales of iron scraps had to be excluded from the taxable turnover. But the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected the claim relating to the turnovers representing sales returns and special bonus discount granted to the customers. The assessee preferred two appeals to the Tribunals against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in so far as it rejected the turnover relating to sales returns and special bonus discount. The department filed an enhancement petition praying the Tribunal to bring to tax the turnover representing iron scraps which were wrongly excluded by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner.

(2.) THE Tribunal confirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and dismissed both the appeal and the enhancement petition. THE State has filed these revision petitions so far as it related to the enhancement petition. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Burmah Shell Co. Ltd. the order of the Tribunal rejecting the enhancement petition on the ground that the assessee were not dealers in iron scraps, cannot be upheld. THE assessee, though not a dealer in iron scraps, is therefore liable to pay sales tax on the said turnover in view of the amended definition of the word "business" in section 2(d) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act (1 of 1959).But it was contended by the learned counsel for the assessee that if the department was aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner excluding the turnover relating to scrap, it ought to have filed an appeal as provided under section 36 and could not have filed an application for enhancement and that, therefore, no relief could be granted to the State in these revision petitions.

(3.) THE learned counsel for the assessee argued that "any person" objecting to an order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner can file an appeal within the period prescribed against such order to the Appellate Tribunal and the words "any person" are wide enough to comprehend within it even the assessing authorities preferring appeals. In support of his argument, he also referred to section 36(6) and rule 29 and the form prescribed for preferring appeals to the Tribunal. Under clause (6) of section 36 the appellant or the respondent may apply for review. According to the learned counsel, if an appeal by the State is not provided in section 36, the wording in clause (6) should be the appellant or the State instead of the words "the appellant" or "the respondent". Rule 29 relating to appeal to the Tribunal did not also specifically exclude the State and merely stated that the appeal should be in form No. 3 and shall be verified in the manner specified therein. From No. 3 is the form prescribed for memorandum of appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. He referred to clause 7, where it required the address to which notices may be sent to the respondent. According to the learned counsel, this column is general in nature and if really the State could not file an appeal under section 36, column 7 relating to address to which the notices may be sent to the respondent should refer to the address of the State Representative to whom notice is to be issued. In addition to these provisions, the learned counsel also relied on an observation of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Lateef Hamid & Co. Before we consider these arguments and the decision, it is necessary for us to refer to the scheme of the Act relating to assessments and appeals therefrom.