(1.) THE petitioner before me filed an application under Section 20 of Act IV of 1938 as early as 1973 and obtained an order of stay of execution by the order dated 18 -6 -1973. He did not care to file an application under Section 19 within sixty days of the said order, as contemplated under the proviso to Section 20. Later, i.e., on 11 -4 -1974, the application out of which the present civil miscellaneous appeal arises came to be filed under Section 19 for scaling down the debt. This is clearly barred by limitation.
(2.) IT is contended on behalf of the appellant -judgment -debtor that Section 19 itself does not provide for any period of limitation, that an application under that section can be filed at any time and that, therefore the proviso to Section 20 should not be invoked in support of the contention that the application under Section 19 is barred by limitation. I am unable to agree with that contention.
(3.) THE contention on behalf of the judgment -debtor is that in spite of the above said proviso to Section 20, there is, no period of limitation at all in respect of an application under Section 19. It is true that if the judgment - debtor has not invoked Section 20 and obtained stay of execution, he can always approach the court which passed the decree (as long as the decree has not been satisfied), for scaling down the debt, if he is entitled to such scaling down on merits. But once he invokes the jurisdiction of the court under Section 20 and obtains stay of execution, then undoubtedly a period of limitation is prescribed by the proviso to that section which specifically says that unless an application under Section 19 (if it had not been already filed) is filed within sixty days from the order of stay the decree shall be executed as it stands.