(1.) The landlord, who lost before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, in the matter of eviction of the tenant-respondent in an application filed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 on the ground that the needed additional accommodation, has come up to this Court. The landlord's case is that the respondent is a tenant under the petitioner occupying two shops in the ground floor of premises No. 75, Harris Road, Madras-2, and is carrying on a non-residential activity. The landlord is residing in the same premises with his family and the members of his family are running an English medium school known as Saraswathi Nursery School in the same premises and the accommodation for running the said school is not sufficient for them and, therefore, he requires the two shops in the occupation of the tenant for the benefit of his family members. The petitioner would say that the respondent has constructed a two storeyed building in the same road and it would not be inconvenient for him to shift his spare part shops to his new premises. As the tenant-respondent failed to vacate in spite of notice, and as the accommodation provided to the school run by the members of the family of the landlord is not sufficient the present petition was filed for eviction of the tenant. The respondent-tenant denied the landlord's case and opposed the application. It is brought out in the evidence that the petitioner is not actually running the nursery school, but it is being run by his wife and daughter. The Rent Controller found that the claim of the landlord was bonafide and that no hardship would be caused to the tenant by his vacating the premises, inasmuch as he would easily shift his business to his own building in the same road. He would not agree with the legal objection raised by the tenant that as the petitioner-landlord was not carrying on a non-residential activity in the premises, he is not entitled to additional accommodation in the same building under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The Rent Controller directed eviction. On appeal, the Appellate Authority reversed the same. The Appellate Court's view was that Section 10(3)(c) of the Act cannot enable a landlord to seek for additional accommodation for the purpose of a business which he is not carrying on. Relying upon the clear distinction made in the language used in Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, and Section 10(3)(a)(iii) the Appellate Authority held that the petition for eviction was not maintainable and allowed the appeal. It is against this, that the present civil revision petition has been filed.
(2.) Mr. G.K. Nambiar, learned counsel for the landlord relied upon a decision of our Court in Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar, 1967 2 MadLJ 81, and urged that commercial activity of a defendant of the landlord can also be taken advantage of for the purpose of eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for securing additional accommodation in the same premises resulting in the eviction of a tenant in charge of such accommodation. But Mr. W.S. Venkataramanjulu, learned counsel for the tenant would distinguish the cited report on the ground that was a case decided under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The question for consideration is, whether in an application for eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act, the landlord can seek for eviction of the tenant in the same premises on the ground he wants additional accommodation of that portion occupied by the tenant for the purpose of expanding the commercial activity indulged in by his defendants.
(3.) Ever since the Act to regulate the letting of residential and non-residential buildings was passed by our State Legislature to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenant therefrom, there was a provision enabling the landlord to apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the buildings, if he is occupying only a part of a building whether residential or non-residential and request the Controller to direct the tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. There was also contemporaneously another provision which would enable a landlord for a similar order for eviction, when he is not in occupation of a residential building on his own or a non-residential building belonging to him. We shall consider these provisions in detail later. But the point is that ever since the special Act to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants was introduced in 1949, a distinction was maintained between the provisions whereby a landlord would ask for additional accommodation from a tenant in the same premises from the provisions whereby a landlord would ask for a building in the occupation of his tenant, if he is himself not occupying a building of his own whether residential or non-residential in the same city, town or village. This distinction which has been maintained throughout by the legislature has to be borne in mind, not only to understand the significance of such a definite classification, but also in the matter of the invocation of those sections for directing the eviction of tenants. In the 1949 Act (XXV of 1949), Section 7 (3)(a)(iii) enable the landlord to seek for eviction from a non-residential building of his tenant, if the landlord did not occupy for purposes of a business which he was carrying on a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled. At some point of time later, the landlord under a similar provision under Section XVIII of 1960, could seek eviction; if the non-residential building is required by him or by his son. Again, this provision was amended in 1973, which entitled the landlord under such circumstances to ask for the premises for his own occupation or for the benefit of any member of his family; for the purpose of the business which he or any member of his family is carrying on. In the wake of those provisions, a decision rendered by our Court by Veeraswami, J. as he then was, was referred to by Mr. Nambiar before me in Kangu v. Ahmad Unnissa Begum, 1963 1 MadLJ 97 . The learned Judge was dealing with a case of eviction under Section 7(3)(c) of the 1949 Act. That clause read :