T I CYCLES OF INDIA Vs. LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition raises somewhat an interesting question. On 16th March, 1965, the second respondent was suspended pending certain enquiries into the charges. Ultimately, after certain criminal proceedings he was dismissed from service on 29th July, 1967. Thereupon, the management (writ petitioner) filed Industrial Dispute No. 32 of 1967 under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). By an order dated 6th January, 1969, the dismissal was upheld by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. After this, the second respondent filed a petition under Section 33c (2) of the Act claiming backwages for the period during suspension, bonus and gratuity. As far as the latter two claims relating to bonus and gratuity, there is no dispute.

(2.) HOWEVER, what the learned Counsel for the petitioner would submit is that inasmuch as in Industrial Dispute No. 32 of 1967 the dismissal having been approved by the Industrial Tribunal, it would follow that the dismissal will relate back to suspension in which event the second respondent would not be entitled to any salary for the period when he was in suspension. Prima facie, this argument look attractive But, on a deeper examination I am not able to countenance the same. It is well settled that unless there are statutory regulations or standing orders, or even the order of appointment clothes the management with the power to suspend, this suspension is illegal. If the suspension is even initially illegal, merely because under Industrial Dispute No. 32 of 1967, the dismissal came to be upheld by reason of the petition under Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act, it would not mean that the suspension would become legal, since there was no power to suspend. Consequently, I am unable to see any error of law in the impugned order.

(3.) THE writ petition will stand dismissed. However, I make no order as to costs.