COIMBATORE-SALEM TRANSPORT PRIVATE LTD Vs. THEIR WORKMEN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against the award of respondent 2, Commissioner of Labour, on a reference made under S. 10a of the Industrial Disputes Act, in a dispute that arose between the petitioner herein, the management of a bus transport company at Erode, and respondent 1, certain workmen of the abovesaid company represented by their union. The dispute in the present case is In regard to four employees by name, Kullappan, Narasimhan, Sreerangan and Usman. In the case of Kullappan, the points referred to the arbitrator for adjudication were: (1) Is the non-employment of M. Kullappan justified ? (2) To what relief he is entitled ? The finding of the arbitrator was that Kullappan while travelling on duty on 26 October 1960 as bus conductor suffered a severe accident Involving fracture in the leg: and it led to his hospitalization. For about one year thereafter, the management was paying wages to Kullappan but thereafter the payment of wages was discontinued. There is, however, reference to the fact that the Insurance company was paying him some amounts till November 1962. Kullappan appears to have written to the management that his disability made him unfit to do the work of a conductor in which post he was employed at the time he sustained the accident, but he might be appointed as a checking Inspector. But the management replied to him on 4 August 1962 that the two jobs were not dissimilar and that if he was not fit to do work as a conductor, he would be equally unfit to do the work of a checking inspector and that they were prepared to give him employment as booking-clerk at Erode. Thereafter, the worker wrote to the management on 10 November 1962, stating that he had become quite well, that he was prepared to join duty after producing a fitness certificate and that he should be posted as a conductor. The management replied to this letter on 11 November 1962, stating that he could not be appointed as a conductor or checking inspector and that since he was not prepared to accept the post of a booking-clerk, they were rejecting his application for appointment. The management took the view that this correspondence showed that the worker's appointment had been terminated long since and that he was actually applying for re-employment. But the arbitrator accepted the contention of the worker and held that there was no formal order at any time terminating the worker's employment till November 1962, when the management told him specifically that if he would not accept the job offered as booking-clerk, they would not give him any employment, The arbitrator expressed the opinion that, in the above circumstances, where the worker was not willing to accept the post of a booking-clerk offered to him by the management, the termination of his employment by the management, in November 1962, must be deemed to be a valid termination. Thereafter, by way of relief the arbitrator ordered the management to pay Kullappan the arrears of back-wages till 20 November 1962 besides retrenchment compensation on the basis of his services up to 20 November 1962.

(2.) IN the case of Narasimhan, Sreerangan and Usman, the points referred to the arbitrator for decision were:

(3.) THE argument pressed before me by the learned Counsel appearing? for the management, who is the petitioner in this writ petition, is that in the case of Kullappan the data afforded by the correspondence that passed between him and the management prior to November 1962, would show that his appointment had come to an end long previously and that what he was seeking from the management was really an order of fresh appointment. But the arbitrator came to a different conclusion on the data that Kullappan's appointment was not really terminated till November 1962. This is a question of fact on which the arbitrator is entitled to come to his own conclusion and it cannot be corrected in writ proceedings. As the learned Counsel for respondent 1 points out, in Kullappan's case the relief awarded by the arbitrator is really for the back-wages prior to the termination of his services as well as retrenchment compensation, and that cannot be considered to be beyond the scope of the dispute regarding the entitlement of relief, which was also referred to the arbitrator for decision. At the same time, learned Counsel for the petitioner also urged that the arbitrator, after finding that the termination of the services of the worker by the management was Justified, acted without jurisdiction in any event, in awarding retrenchment compensation. I will consider this point along with a similar point urged in the case of the other three employees, regarding the nature of relief awarded by the arbitrator.