RAMIAH V Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE appellant, V. Ramiah, was employed as a cashier in the State Bank of India, Madras. Aftera prolonged enquiry, upon charges framed, the local board of the bank, by proceedings dated 23 February 1962, intimated to the appellant that they were terminating his services under Rule 14 of the State Bank of India (Sub-Accountants and Head Cashiers) Service Rules, after tendering him two months' salary, in lies of notice, as provided for in Clause 1 of the Service Agreement. The appellant instituted Writ Petition No. 528 of 1962, before Veeraswami, J. , for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing this order upon the grounds shown. In a judgment, in which the respective contentions of parties have been elaborately dealt with the learned Judge held that no case has been made out for interference with this order under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant has appealed from this judgment.

(2.) THE arguments presented before us by the learned Advocate-General for the appellant, and the learned Counsel for the respondent-bank (Sri V. K. Thiruveakatachari) do involve certain questions of considerable interest, and some significance. They impinge upon the amplitude of our power under Article 226, in interfering with orders of Equivalent Citation this kind, which ex facie are orders terminating an employment under a power derived from contract, by a statutory body, which, indisputably, has certain functions affecting the public, and also may be said to possess a quasi-governmental character. Another of the vital questions is, whether such a body acts as a tribunal in this kind of situation, and is bound to exercise its power as a quasi-judicial act, subservient to the norms of natural justice. A third question is, whether the order of termination, which could be termed the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding, or to be interpreted as a punishment imposed by the respondent-bank under powers of its disciplinary jurisdiction, or, as, what the order purports to be, a simple termination under contract. It may be best, even before we proceed into the facts, which could be compressed into a relatively brief scope, for the purpose of this writ appeal that these several questions are first formulated.

(3.) ACCORDINGLY, we may first formulate the questions, which arise in this writ appeal, as hereunder: