RAVAL AND CO Vs. K G RAMACHANDRAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) W. P. No. 1124 of 1963 comes before us on a reference made by one of us (srinivasan, J ). It was a proceeding in prohibition by Messrs Raval and Co. (petitioners), seeking to restrain the respondents, including the Chief Rent controller, Madras (4th respondent) from prosecuting or proceeding with a petition for the fixation of fair rent, under the Madras Rent Control Acts. Connected with this are two other proceedings, namely, C. R. P. 1816 of 1963 and Appn. No. 2443 of 1963 in C. S. 163 of 1962, in which certain clearly inter-linked question are involved. Our learned brother (Srinivasan, J.) felt the difficulty that the catena of decisions of this court as far as the Madras Rent Control Acts are concerned, has been only in the consistent directions that these Acts did purport to interfere with contractual tenancies both as regards the fixation of fair rents and as regards the respective rights of landlords and tenants, in the matter of eviction and the grounds for eviction; while certain recent decisions of the Supreme Court, no doubt not upon the Madras Acts but upon similar enactments if other States, appear to justify the interpretation that the contractual tenancies should first be terminated by a notice under S. 111 (h) of the Transfer of Property Act, after which alone the procedure under the special Acts would become applicable, their object being to give this additional protection to what are termed "statutory tenancies".

(2.) THIS explains the reference, and as the matter has been argued before us, the following questions emerge for our consideration:-

(3.) APART from these questions, which are on the interpretation of the particular statute, two questions of their constitutional validity have also been raised before us. The first is that amending Act 11 of 1964, under which a ceiling in respect of non-residential tenements, namely Rs. 400 Specified in S. 30 of Madras Act 18 of 1960 was done away with and further section in the amending Act (S. 3) was introduced for the abatement of certain pending proceedings, is ultra vires, as offending Art 14 of the Constitution, the argument is that both as a matter of legislative history and in the substantial sense, the amending enactment embodies a hostile discrimination against the landlords of non-residential premises without a reasonable basis or objective. On this aspect, even the bona fides of the amending enactment have been assailed and it is contended that the enactment was hostile rushed through the legislature without the salutary procedure of a reference t a Select Committee and in a matter of one or two days, because the concerned Minister had a personal motive to obtain the benefit of the legislation. An interpretation of S. 3 of Madras act 11 of 1964 also arises particularly in connection with the facts in Appn No. 2443 of 1964 In C. S. 163 of 1962. The other constitutional point raised during the arguments relates to an alleged infringement of the protection afforded by Art. 19 in more than one respect. The learned Advocate General relied upon Art. 358 of the Constitution fir the victim that the provisions of Art 19 are themselves suspended during the operation of the present Proclamation of Emergency; the tenability of this view, in the context of the interpretation of Art. 358 in relation to enactments prior to the Emergency such as Madras Act 18 of 1960 is also a matter on which arguments have been addressed.