A.M. CHAKRAPANI REDDIAR Vs. ISSA MUNIRATNAM CHETTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner is the landlord who filed a petition under S. 7 of the Act XXV of 1949, for the eviction of the respondent -tenant. The grounds put forward were bona fide need for his own occupation and wilful default in the payment of rent: The petitioner alleged that he is a merchant carrying on business in rented premises and that he does not own any residential building in the city. The tenancy itself was partly for residence and partly for the tenant's business. It was further alleged that is the month of August 1959, the tenant issued a cheque towards payment of rent, which cheque was not honoured, The tenant contended that the landlord owns one building and has another rented building in the city. He denied wilful default, contending further that if he is asked to vacate, it will involve hardship. The House Rent Controller accepted the contentions of the landlord. It would appear that the respondent -tenant died after filing the counter, and his brother was brought on record as his legal representative. It transpired from the evidence that the rent for August remained unpaid. It was further admitted by the respondent, the legal representative, that he only proposes to do business, the business which the deceased tenant was carrying on having apparently come to an end. The House Rent Controller also found that the landlord has to run his oil business in three places in the city and that his requirement for non -residential purposes was also bona fide and reasonable. There was accordingly an order for eviction. The respondent carried an appeal. It was before the appellate authority that the petition had been filed under the old Act, which had been since repealed and replaced by the Act of 1960, that the Rent Controller had erroneously applied the new Act which had come into force, and the contention was advanced on behalf of the appellant -tenant that the old Act should have been applied. On a consideration of certain decisions, the appellate authority accepted the validity of this contention. The appellate authority further, found that despite the admission of the tenant that the cheque issued towards the rent for August was dishonoured and that month's rent still remained unpaid, it could not be regarded as wilful default, for the default was only for one month. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the order of eviction set aside.

(2.) This order is challenged in this revision petition. The short question is whether on the two points dealt with, the order of the appellate authority discloses any error.

(3.) Looking at the matter broadly, there appears to be no doubt that when a tenant deliberately issues a cheque, which he knows would be dishonoured, better evidence of the wilful nature of the default in payment of the rent can hardly exist. On the facts regarding the requirement of the landlord also, there is no doubt that the bona fides must be said to have been established. Even looking at the question of the hard ship to the tenant in making an order of eviction, it is obvious that the tenant was not carrying on any business, and contrasted with the needs of the business, which is being carried on by the landlord, there cannot be said to be any hardship to the tenant by the order of eviction. It is no doubt true that the appellate authority has jurisdiction to come to a conclusion different from that of the initial authority, but it is obvious that that conclusion should be reasonable and should be on a consideration of the entire set of facts. I am unable to see how it can be said that merely because the default is only for one month, it could straightaway be deemed to be not wilful. The action of the tenant in issuing a cheque, which he obviously knew would be dishonoured is certainly a pointer and should be had regard to in coming to any conclusion on that head. The appellate authority has failed to note this feature. The appellate authority has not also dealt with the bona fides of the landlord's requirement, for it thought that the decision upon this question should be on the grounds available under the old Act and not under the new Act.