S SESHADRINTHA SARMA Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this revision proceeding, the petitioner (Seshadrinatha Sarma) has been convicted, upon two counts, under Rule 3 and Rule 4 (1) of the Madras Factories Rules read with Section 92 of the Madras Factories Act, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200 on each count. Three grounds of considerable interest have been urged before me by learned Counsel for the revision petitioner, with regard to the propriety of the conviction. The first ground is that the prosecution is barred by virtue of Section 106 of the Factories Act, 1948. The second ground is that, on the facts, this is not a 'factory' at all, because, though ten or more workers were admittedly working in the establishment during the relevant period, no "manufacturing process" was being carried on within the premises. It is strenuously contended1 that that has been the case of the revision petitioner throughout, that he even attempted to file an appeal from the decision of the Inspector or relevant executive authority to the effect that 'the premises constituted a "factory", and that the Government merely replied to the revision petitioner that he might seek legal advice if he so desired. The third ground is related in a certain sense to the facts which have been urged -upon the second ground. It is that, in any event, 'there is no element of mens rea made out by the prosecution, and that proof of this element also is essential, on the authority of Nathulal v. State of M. P. .

(2.) I shall first dispose of the ground relating *o limitation, and, admittedly, this is dealt with in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. On this aspect, all that can be said is that the facts upon which the ground was sought to be pressed were not made out, and that the evidence relating to those facts is not before the court. It is impossible to hold, on the record as it stands, that the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector in 1960, and that no action was then taken thereon, thereby attracting the terms of Section 106 that the complaint must be made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector. In the present case, there was a visit on 14. 2. 1964, and the prosecution claimed that the offence came to the knowledge of the inspector only on that date; the prosecution is admittedly in time, if this is the relevant date. A document on which learned Counsel for the revision petitioner sought to rely, was not marked at the trial, and was not admitted as additional evidence. Under those circumstances, I must certainly hold that no facts were established which would show that the prosecution was time-barred, applying the principle of Section 106 of the Act.

(3.) THE second point is of greater interest. The definition of "manufacturing process" to be found in Section 2, Sub-clause (k) of the Act, came up for some discussion by Ramaswami J in In re Chinniah AIR 1957 Mad 755. I must initially point out that the definition as it stands, is very wide in its terms. Section 2 (k), Subclause (i) would include, making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, etc. The learned Judge, Ramaswami J. , was aware of the implication of such a wide definition, and the learned Judge thought that, in order to constitute a manufacture there should be, essentially, some kind of a transformation of the substance. Mere labour bestowed on an article even if the labour is applied through machinery, will not make it a manufacture, unless it has progressed so far that transformation ensues, and the article becomes commercially known as another and - different article from that as which it begins its existence. I am not quite free from doubt whether, with great respect to the learned Judge, the concluding part of this observation could be sustained, on the basis of the wide phraseology of Section 2 (k) (i ). But, this apart, the actual facts of the present matter make it clear beyond doubt that a "manufacturing process" with the use of power was involved in this case. Admittedly, what is happening here is that the liquid known as Latex is converted into sheet-rubber, by a mechanical1 process which deprives this liquid of the water content and transforms it into sheet rubber not merely this, but machinery and power are both employed to achieve this. There has been some discussion upon the definition of the word "rubber" occurring in the Rubber Act, 24 of 1947. But I do not think that the law requires that this matter of terminology should be gone into by court. So long as there has been an indisputable transformation of substance by the use of machinery, and the transformed substance is commercially marketable, we have a process of 'manufacture' as defined. This ground has necessarily to fail, on the facts of the present case.