SAMIDURAI Vs. THANGAVELU UDAYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision case is directed against the order of the learned Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Ulundurpet, in C.A. No. 41 of 1964. The prior facts leading up to the order now under revision, are briefly the following. In C.C. No. 3609 of 1963 on the file of Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Vridhachalam one Thangavelu, who is a well -to -do pattadar of Perianesalur village, was prosecuted by the Station House Officer, Vepur, on a charge -sheet filed under Sec. 353, Indian Penal Code. The. charge -sheet itself was filed after investigation was conducted by the Police on a complaint filed by P.W. 1 in that case, the Village Munsif of the village, who had alleged therein that when in pursuance of a demand for arrears of land revenue, he had distrained and attached a bull belonging to the accused, the latter had assaulted P.W. 4 the Talayari and rescued the bull from his custody. The learned Sub -Magistrate, Vridhachalam, acquitted the accused, giving sufficient reasons for finding that the prosecution case was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, Thangavelu, the accused, filed a petition G.M.P. No. 115 of 1964 under Sec. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, before the Sub -Magistrate, Vridhachalam, alleging that the complaint which the Village Munsif, P.W. 1, Samidurai gave to the" Police about the assault and the rescue of the bull, was a false complaint, given with the intent to cause injury to him (Thangavelu) and therefore a complaint might be filed against him by the Court for the said offence against Samidurai, the Village Munsif. The learned Magistrate of Vridhachalam dismissed this petition, holding that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent, the Village Munsif, had filed the complaint against Thangavelu falsely and with intent to injure, and that the criminal case ended in acquittal, mainly because the accused was given the benefit of reasonable doubt, and because the prosecution testimony was given by interested witnesses. Against this order, Thangavelu filed an appeal before the District Magistrate, South Arcot, under Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code, who, thereafter, transferred the case to the Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Ulundurpet, for disposal. The Sub -Divisional Magistrate after an analysis of the evidence, came to the conclusion that there was adequate material to hold that a charge under Sec. an, Indian Penal Code, was supportable, and therefore reversed the order of the Sub -Magistrate and directed that a complaint under Sec. 211, Indian Penal Code, be filed in the proper Court, in the interests of justice. Against this decision Samidurai, the Village Munsif, the respondent in the lower Court, has filed this revision.

(2.) Learned Counsel, Sri Gopalaswami, appearing for the respondent in this revision case, the appellant in the Court below, argued on a preliminary point, that the learned District Magistrate, South Arcot, alone had jurisdiction under Sec. 476 -B read with Sec. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, to dispose of the appeal made to him, and that the order transferring the appeal to the Sub -Divisional Magistrate, Ulundurpet, was without jurisdiction. I am of opinion that this contention is right. Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code, is a self -contained section, and it gives jurisdiction for disposal of an appeal against an order passed by a Court under Sec. 476 or 476 -A, Criminal Procedure Code, only to the Court to which the first Court, is subordinate, within the meaning of Sec. 195(3), Criminal Procedure Code. Sec. 195(3) defines that a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie, from the appealable decrees or sentences of the former Court. To understand the scope of the term appeals ordinarily lie one has to go to Sec. 407, Criminal Procedure Code, as amended, in Madras. Sec. 407(1) of the amended Act, states that a person convicted on trial held by any Magistrate of the Second or Third Class may appeal to the District Magistrate. The power of entertaining an appeal is thus conferred only on the District Magistrate, against the sentences passed by a Second or Third Class Magistrate. Sec. 407(2), Criminal Procedure Code, gives the District Magistrate the power to transfer appeals to a Magistrate of the First Class subordinate to him. But this power of transfer under Sec. 407(2), Criminal Procedure Code, cannot give jurisdiction to the Sub -Divisional Magistrate to deal with an appeal under Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code, because of the provision in Sec. 476 -B, which specifically states that the superior Court indicated therein (which will be the District Magistrate's Court as explained above for the present case under revision) alone has jurisdiction to take the further steps outlined in Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code, namely, the giving of notice to the parties, directing the withdrawal of the complaint etc.' In other words, Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code, is a self -contained provision, in the matter of the appeals to which it refers, and Sec. 407(2) , Criminal Procedure Code, to extend the jurisdiction under Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code, to a Sub -Divisional Magistrate.

(3.) An analogous situation was considered by the Supreme Court in Kuldip Singh v/s. The State of Punjab, (1956) S.C.J. 387. where, in regard to certain proceedings, before a Subordinate Judge of the First Class, a complaint under Sec. 476 -A, Criminal Procedure Code, was filed by the Senior Subordinate Judge. Against this complaint an appeal was made to the District Judge, who transferred it for disposal to the Additional District Judge. The Supreme Court held inter alia that the complaint filed by the Senior Subordinate Judge in regard to proceedings before the Subordinate Judge of the First Class, was irregular, but we are not now concerned with this part of the decision. The Supreme Court also held, that when the matter came in appeal before the District Judge, it was the latter who should, have passed appropriate orders either under Sec. 376 -A, Criminal Procedure Code, or by sending it to the original Court, but instead he sent it to the Additional District Judge, who had no jurisdiction to act either under Sec. 476 -A or Sec. 476 -B, Criminal Procedure Code.