DHANAPAL CHETTI Vs. AVVA KANNIAH CHETTI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner is the tenant. In R.C.O.P. No. 20 of 1960 the respondent landlord sought for eviction of the tenant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act of 1960. The landlord claimed that he was carrying on business in a rented premises, which premises was wholly inadequate to his needs. On that ground he purchased the premises in question. In 1958, he had filed an application R.C.O.P. No. 22 of 1958 under the repealed Act, which was dismissed, as also an appeal there from. The ground upon which that petition was dismissed was that under the old Act, the landlord who was in occupation, for the purposes of his business, of a premises, to the possession of which he was entitled, that is to say, as a tenant, was not eligible to the relief of eviction of his tenant from premises which might be the landlord's own. The new Act, by Section 10(3)(a)(iii), however made a departure, and enabled the landlord to obtain possession of the premises which he had let out, so long as he is not occupying, for the purpose of his business, which he is carrying on, a non -residential building which is his own. Under the new Act, therefore, the possession of rented premises for the purpose of a business is no bar to obtaining the eviction of a tenant from the premises which belongs to the landlord. After the new Act came into force, the landlord filed a fresh application. He stated that he is not occupying any premises of his own for the purposes of his business and sought the eviction of the tenant. The contention put forward by the tenant was that the application was barred by res judicata. It was urged that there was no change of circumstances entitling the landlord to maintain his petition. It was also stated that the landlord had two either non -residential buildings in the locality.

(2.) THE House Rent Controller thought that though the new Act enlarged the scope of an application for eviction by Section 10(3)(a)(iii), as contrasted with Section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the old Act, yet, the authority had to be satisfied about the bona fides of the landlord. In disposing of the previous application, it was then held, that there were no bona fides. On behalf of the landlord, it was urged that the question of bona fides cannot possibly remain static and that it must necessarily change in the changed circumstances. The House Rent Controller found that the landlord had demolished one of the non -residential premises owned by him after the disposal of the earlier petition. Nevertheless, the Rent Controller was not satisfied that there was a change in the circumstances. It was also held that premises No. 35/1 was available for occupation of the landlord. On these facts, the lack of bona fides was inferred by the Rent Controller who dismissed the petition.

(3.) THE landlord moved the District Judge in revision. The learned District Judge observed that there could be nothing like bona fides in the abstract. He, however, held that the Subordinate Judge had found the present petition to be bona fide. He was satisfied that the petitioner did require the premises for his own business, and when the landlord was not in occupation of a premises which is his own, the law entitled him to an order of eviction. He accordingly set aside the orders of the authorities below and directed the tenant to deliver possession of the premises to the landlord within two months.