SUBRAMANIAM CHETTIAR Vs. MUTHIAH PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question that arises for determination in this appeal is whether there is a period of limitation for an application by the mortgagor-plaintiff in a redemption suit to pass a final decree and whether Article 181 of the Limitation Act applies to such an application.

(2.) A preliminary decree for redemption was passed on 21-6-1936, granting two months time for payment of the amount. The plaintiff paid the amount within the time-fixed but did not make an application for passing a final decree directing the mortgagee to deliver the documents and possession of the property. He filed two execution petitions. E. P. Nos. 252 and 253 Of 1949, in the Chief Court of pudukottah but they were dismissed as being barred by limitation. This appeal arises out of the application filed by the plaintiff on 2-11-1951 for passing a final decree. A plea of limitation was taken as the application was filed long after the expiry of three years and it was contended that Article 181 of the Limitation Act would apply to this case. The Courts below, relying on a decision of Somayya J. reported in angammal v. Muhammad Sulaiman Lebbai, 1945-2 Mad LJ 239: (AIR 1946 Mad 38) (A) took the view that there is no period of limitation fixed for an application of the present nature. There can be no doubt that the Courts below have not properly appreciated the effect of the decision relied upon. In that case a preliminary decree for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage was passed on 151-1935 and the time fixed for payment was 15-1-1936. The plaintiff did not deposit the amount on or before that date; nor did she ask for extension of time under Order 34, Rule 7 (2), C. P. Code. She deposited the amount towards the end of 1942 and then applied on 2-2-1943 under Order 34, rule 8 of the Code asking the Court to pass a final decree with a direction to the defendant to deliver the mortgaged property. In that case the application by the mortgagor for passing a final decree was well within time as it was filed on 2-21943, the deposit having been made about the end of 1942. But the objection taken in that case was that the mortgagor-plaintiff having known that the time fixed for payment had expired in January, 1936 must have applied, within three years from that date, under Article 181 of the Limitation Act for an extension of time; and having failed to apply for an extension of time the application for a final decree Was not sustainable. The learned Judge took the view that in so far as the, payment is concerned, no period of limitation is provided and it will be open to the mortgagor-plaintiff to pay under Order 34, Rule 8, C. P. Code at any time before the final decree debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the mortgaged property had been passed. In that case the mortgagee-defendant did not take advantage of the pro-Tlsion in rule 8, Sub-rule (3) and apply for a final decree debarring the plaintiff from all right to redeem the property; and so long as the mortgagee-defendant did not have recourse to such a provision, it was always open to the mortgagor-plaintiff to deposit the amount at any time and no application for extension was necessary; and since no application for extension of time fixed for payment was necessary, no question of any period of limitation would arise. What was contended in that decision was not that an application by the mortgagor-plaintiff for a final decree was necessary but an application for extension of the time fixed for payment, which application was found to be not necessary in view of the language of Order 34, Rule 8. In the present case however the amount has been paid within the time provided for in the preliminary decree and the mortgagor-plaintiff's right to apply for a final decree therefore arises on such payment and such an application is specifically provided for under rule 8, the application being one for a final decree ordering the defendant to deliver up the documents referred to in the preliminary decree and if necessary to re-transfer the property and also to put the mortgagor-plaintiff in possession. The cause of action for an application arises on payment and the period of limitation provided for such an application must be held to be governed by Article 181 of the limitation Act, which will be three years from the date of the deposit. Here the application was filed long after the date of the deposit and as such it is barred by limitation. The principle of the decision above referred to is not applicable to the facts of the present case, and the lower Courts have wrongly applied that decision to the present case. The lower Courts have erred in holding that the plaintiff's application for a final decree is not barred by limitation.

(3.) THE result is the appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's application will stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs throughout.