(1.) All these writ petitions are filed challenging the common order dated 22.09.2015 passed by the Bar Council of India, New Delhi, wherein and whereby, all the writ petitioners were suspended from practice pending disciplinary proceedings. In the very same impugned order, the Bar Council of India had also constituted a Committee consisting of Chairman and two Members of Karnataka Bar Council to hold the enquiry and conduct the disciplinary proceedings against these writ petitioners and others at Bangalore in the premises of Bar Council of Karnataka.
(2.) The Bar Council of India issued the impugned proceedings on 22.09.2015 citing two incidence dated 14.09.2015 and 16.09.2015 took place inside the High Court Campus holding procession in Court halls and entering into the Chamber of Judges, etc.
(3.) We are not inclined to go into the merits of the allegations made against these petitioners and others in these writ petitions, as admittedly the enquiry by the said Enquiry Committee at Bangalore is said to have commenced already and reached the stage of passing the final orders. Though the learned counsels appearing for the respective petitioners in these writ petitions sought to contend that the impugned order passed was without any authority and that holding the enquiry at Bangalore is without jurisdiction, these contentions are liable to be rejected on the reason that similar contentions raised in respect of other disciplinary proceedings initiated against some advocates at Chennai, were already considered and rejected by the Division Bench of this Court in a case in (K.Sathyabal v. Bar Council of Tamilnadu, 2016 2 LW 230) wherein one of us (KRCBJ) was a party. Accordingly, by following the said decision, we reject the above contentions. However, we would like to consider the present writ petitions only on the limited question as to whether the prolonged suspension of these petitioners, pending enquiry, can be sustained.