DURAISAMY Vs. R SURESHLAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) TENANT is the revision petitioner in each revision petition. These civil revision petitions arise against the order dated 25. 10. 2004 and 26. 10. 2004 in R. C. A. Nos. 4, 6, 10, 11, 12 of 2003 and 4 of 2004 by the Subordinate Judge, Bhavani, which themselves were preferred against the order dated 21. 12. 2001 and 22. 9. 2003 passed in R. C. O. P. Nos. 24, 35, 28, 30, 42, 45 of 1999 by the Principal District Munsif, Bhavani.

(2.) ADMITTEDLY, one Lulla, who is now no mom, was the landlord and it seems that he expired in or around, 1988. The present respondent claiming to be the Power of Attorney Agent of the deceased landlord, after filing the document of Power of Attorney, has filed the eviction petitions on the ground of owner's occupation and bona fide requirement for demolition and reconstruction. He also claimed to be one of the legal representatives of the deceased. Be living that he is one of the legal representatives, the petitions become maintainable since it was also held in R. Perianne Asari and another v. Jayakumar, (1997) 1 L. W. 727, that co-owner can maintain, petition on behalf of other co-owners if objection is not raised by the tenant in lower Courts. Without going into the objections, assuming that the petitions are maintainable, let us now go to the, question of bona fide requirement for owner's occupation as well as demolition and reconstruction.

(3.) BEFORE ever the bona fides of demolition and reconstruction is analysed, it is to be mentioned that both the grounds of requirement for owner's occupation as well as demolition and reconstruction may not be simultaneously maintainable. Those grounds may be raised as alternative to each other. But both cannot survive simultaneously. It is so because one. Is destructive of the other. Before ever demolition is made if owner is to utilise, then demolition becomes frivolous. Similarly, if demolition is made, owner's occupation can be claimed only upon reconstruction, which is a prospective chance of existence. No claim could be based upon a prospective chance of existence of corpus. It is in that way, one is destructive of the other. It was so held in K. A. M. A. K. Nataraja Nadar and sons v. R. Kannan, (2005) 4 M. L. J. 222: (2005) 5 C. T. C. 537.