LAWS(MAD)-2006-9-257

K SULOCHANA Vs. K G JAYASANKAR

Decided On September 19, 2006
K. SULOCHANA Appellant
V/S
K.G. JAYASANKAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER was selected and appointed to the post of Extra Departmental Branch Post Master (in short EDBPM) at Ananthanadarkudi Post Office by proceedings of the second respondent dated 27-12-2001. Challenging the selection and appointment of the petitioner, the first respondent herein, who had also applied for the said post, but was rejected on the ground of non-fulfilment of income/property criteria, filed an application, O.A. No.12 of 2002, before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chennai (in short 'the Tribunal'). The Tribunal, by the order dated 13-08-2002, which is impugned in this writ petition, set aside the selection of the petitioner and directed the second respondent to consider the case of the first respondent for appointment as EDBPM. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

(2.) THE Tribunal, after referring to certain decisions of the Supreme Court and more particularly the decision in Indra Sawhney case (Mandal Commission case), a Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court and the report filed by the Talwar Committee, was of the view that the question of ownership of property or of independent income cannot be qualifications for appointment as EDBPM and the instruction issued by the Department also did not say that the ownership of property and independent income are the necessary qualifications for appointment. THE Tribunal was also of the opinion that if the object for imposing such income/property criteria is to safeguard the interest of the Department, the same could be achieved by taking a fidelity bond or security bond from the selected person.

(3.) IN support of his contention, learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of INdia v. Chandrasekharan (1998[1] Supreme 457), wherein it was held that when the first respondent has accepted the terms and conditions with regard to the production of securing marks in the SSLC examination and production of income certificate who participated in the selection and has failed to succeed in the selection, cannot turn around and say that the selection process is bad. The facts of the case are that respondents 1 and 2 therein were the contestants along with the respondents 3 to 11 therein and several others for the promotional post of Assistant Purchase Officer from the post of Purchase Assistant-B. The promotion was based on a written test followed by an interview and assessment of the confidential reports as prescribed in the Office Memorandum dated 9-7-1987. The marks prescribed for written test, interview and confidential report were 50, 30 and 20 respectively. It was also prescribed that to qualify for promotion, one should get minimum of 50% prescribed for each head and also 60% in the aggregate. The grievance of the repsondents 1 and 2, who did not find their names in the select list, was that on account of unduly disproportionate marks allotted to interview and confidential report, that enabled the Departmental Promotion Committee to manipulate the results which denied the reasonable expectation of candidates who secured maximum marks in the written test. When the select list was quashed by the Tribunal on that ground, an appeal was filed before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court held as follows: "IN absence of any mala fides pleaded and established, importance given to interview could not be termed as arbitrary or violative of Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution. The Tribunal went wrong in applying the ratio laid down in Ashok Kumar Yadav's case and in upsetting selection list." IN the present case, even though the first respondent has secured more marks than the petitioner, but he failed to produce the income/property certificate which is contemplated as one of the conditions in the advertisement, applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above said decision to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal should not have interfered with the selection of the petitioner.