LAWS(MAD)-1995-9-103

S NALLASAMY Vs. SECOND ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT MADRAS

Decided On September 19, 1995
S NALLASAMY Appellant
V/S
SECOND ADDITIONAL LABOUR COURT MADRAS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PETITIONER-workman was employed in the sales yard at the respondent company's factory. On 24 February 1984 at about 4. 05 p. m. he was caught carrying a hammer by the security staff. Two days later, he was suspended, and enquiry was held and the petitioner's services were terminated by way of dismissal.

(2.) PETITIONER having raised an industrial dispute, the matter was referred for adjudication to the II Additional Labour Court , Madras , which has, by the impugned award, dated 9 March 1987, held that the non-employment of the petitioner , was justified and dismissed the claim. The points now urged before me are the same as those that were urged before the Labour Court . In addition, it was contended that the employer had a duty to serve a second show cause notice which the management has failed to do. As regards that contention, it was submitted by the counsel for the respondent-management that there is no such requirement in the Standing Orders, and that point had also not been raised by the petitioner before the labour Court.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner made a vehement submission that the value of the hammer could only have been Rs. 10 to Rs. 15 and it was wholly unjust to have inflicted a penalty of dismissal for theft of an article of such small value. The Labour Court considered this aspect of the matter as well and had held that the nature of the charge against the petitioner was such that it also constituted an offence under the Indian Penal Code. After referring to the judgment of this Court in T. Seeralan v. Second Additional Labour Court & Ors. 1986 II CLR 210, the Court held that when a charge of theft is proved, there is very little scope for generosity to be shown, or to bring into existence minor punishment for such derelictions. The Labour Court following the judgment of this Court, held that there was little scope for interfering with the punishment imposed on the petitioner, invoking S. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act.