LAWS(MAD)-1995-8-59

COMMISSIONER OF LAND ADMINISTRATION CHEPAUK MADRAS Vs. EXECUTIVE OFFICER ARULMIGHU THEAGARAJA SWAMY DEVASTHANAM THIRUVARUR THANJAVUR

Decided On August 07, 1995
COMMISSIONER OF LAND ADMINISTRATION, CHEPAUK, MADRAS Appellant
V/S
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ARULMIGHU THEAGARAJA SWAMY DEVASTHANAM, THIRUVARUR, THANJAVUR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE above appeal has been filed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 13. 6. 1994 in W. P. No. 3886 of 1985, whereunder the learned single Judge has chosen to allow the writ petition filed by the 1 st respondent, praying for a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the proceedings of the 1 st appellant before this Court dated 12. 11. 1984, rejecting the revision filed by the 1 st respondent against the orders of the 2nd appellant dated 23. 3. 1984 on the grounds of laches and delay.

(2.) THE Village Tiruvarur of Thanjavur District is an Inam estate taken over on 20. 6. 1977 under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Inams Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 and the Tamil Nadu Inam estates Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as'the Act'and 'the Rules'respectively ). THE proceedings before us has a past history which we consider it unnecessary to be adverted to in detail for the purpose of deciding the issues raised before us. Suffice it to notice that on an earlier occasion, the 1st respondent by his proceedings dated 19. 7. 1983 held that the rejection of the revision petition on the ground of limitation was wrong and remitted the case to the Director of Survey and Settlement for fresh enquiry and disposal on merits. THEreupon, the 2nd appellant entertained the matter and ultimately dismissed the revision petition in R. P. 28/83 by his order dated 23. 3. 1984 since the 2nd appellant felt that there no sufficient reasons to interfere on merits with the well considered order of the Settlement officer, Thanjavur. THE order of the Settlement Officer dated 23. 3. 1984 was served by registered post with acknowledgment due on the Advocate appearing for the 1st respondent on 2. 4. 1984. THE further revision petition filed by the 1 st respondent which gave raise to the present proceedings was said to have been received in the Office of the 1st appellant on 13. 6. 1984. Since, according to the 1st respondent, who was the revision petitioner before the 1 st appellant, there was a delay of eight days in filing the revision petition, a request was made for condonation of such delay. This was on the assumption of the 1st respondent that the time stipulated for filing an appeal was sixty days. THE 1st appellant proceeded upon the assumption that the time limit for filing a further revision petition was thirty days and on that basis, calculated the delay also to be forty-two days and not eight days as claimed in the petition of the 1 st respondent. Not satisfied with the sufficiency of the reasons for the condonation of delay of forty-two days, the 1st appellant rejected the revision petition as time barred. Aggrieved, the 1st respondent has filed the above writ petition.

(3.) RULE 8, as noticed supra, provided for a revision petition being filed by a person aggrieved by any order or proceedings of the director of Settlement or of a District Collector before the erstwhile Board of revenue, whose powers have devolved now on the 1st respondent. Sub-rule (2)stipulates that every such petition shall be filed within sixty days from the date of communication of the order or proceedings of the Director of Settlement as the case may be. The proviso enables the revisional authority, such as the 1st appellant, to admit a petition preferred after the expiry of the period aforesaid if it is satisfied that the applicant before it had sufficient reasons for not preferring the petition within the said period. This in substance is the same, in content, as the provisions contained under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Sec. 70 of the Act provided for limitation in respect of the proceedings under the Act. While laying down the position that a copy of every decision or order in any proceedings against which an appeal or revision as provided for under the Act shall be communicated in such a manner as may be prescribed, it was stipulated therein that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation in respect of any appeal or application or revision the date of communication of copy of the decision or order to the appellant or applicant shall be deemed to be the date of the decision or order. Sub-sec. (3)of Sec. 70 provided that the provisions of Sec. 4 and Sub-secs. (1), (2) of Sec. 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall, as far as may be, applied to any appeal or application or revision petition under the Act. It could be seen on a perusal of the above provision, that consciously and deliberately, the legislature has avoided reference to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in Sec. 70 of the Act. The fact that it was a conscious omission by the legislature and apparently the Legislature wanted to leave the matter to the discretion of the rule-making authority is made clear from the incorporation of the proviso to sub-rule (2) of RULE 8 of the RULEs which, as noticed supra was almost identical in substance and purport to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. If the matter stood thus, the 1st respondent would have been well justified in his submission about the powers of the 1st appellant to condone the delay. But unfortunately, for the 1st respondent in 1968 an amendment was introduced in g. O. Ms. No. 1037, Revenue, dated 18. 5. 1968 susbtituting a new RULE 54 in the place of the then existing RULE 54. It may be noticed that a provision in all respects similar and identical to RULE 54 was substituted in RULE 68 was also substituted to the relevant rules also in a pari materia legislation like the tamil Nadu Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) RULEs. The stipulation contained in Sub-rule (2) of RULE 54 makes it beyond doubt or controversy that the revisional authorities shall have no power to condone any delay in filing a revision beyond the period of limitation prescribed therefor in the Act and the RULEs on the ground that the revision petitioner had sufficient cause for not preferring the revision petition within such period. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent on the proviso to Sub-r. ule (2) to RULE 8, in our view, is inappropriate and futile in the teeth of the amendment introduced in G. O. Ms. No. 1037, Revenue, dated 18. 5. 1968. The newly substituted RULE 54, being the latest in point of time, has to prevail over the proviso to Sub-rule (2) of RULE 8, which has been made at an earlier point of time. This Court, even in case of any conflict between the two rules has to interpret them harmoniously to avoid any inconsistency and stalemate arising in the application of the rules in the teeth of the later provision specifically introduced in the form of a new RULE 54 with a specific stipulation as the one contained in Sub-rule (2) of RULE 54 of the RULEs and, therefore, it has to be necessarily held that the proviso to Sub-rule (2) of RULE 8 had been impliedly repealed. Such a construction, in our view also is in keeping with the intention of the legislature which deliberately avoided making any reference to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act in Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 70 of the act. It would have been well for the rule making authority if it had bestowed more care, caution and responsibility while substituting RULE 54 in 1968 to have had formally deleted the proviso to Sub-rule (2) of RULE 8. The fact that it has not been done, more appears to us to be on account of oversight than due to any specific object or purpose inasmuch as the proviso to Sub-rule (2) of rule 8 cannot stand side by side with the newly substituted RULE 54 of the rules. The newly substituted RULE 54 also, as noticed supra, casts an obligation on the part of the revisional authority to reject a revision petition presented after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor whether sufficient cause has been shown or not and whether the plea of limitation has been set up as a defence or not. In the teeth of such a mandatory requirement of the newly substituted RULE 54, the proviso to Sub-rule (2) of RULE 8 can safely and reasonably be held to have stood impliedly repealed with effect from the date of the Government Order made in G. O. Ms. No. 1037, Revenue, dated 18. 5. 1968.