LAWS(MAD)-1995-8-69

THANGAVEL Vs. KUPPUSAMY MUDALIAR

Decided On August 28, 1995
THANGAVEL Appellant
V/S
KUPPUSAMY MUDALIAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE revision is against the order of the learned District Munsif, Gudiyattam rejecting the petition filed under Section 47 Civil Procedure Code to record discharge of the decree. In the petition, the judgment-debtor has stated that in a panchayat the decree-holder has agreed to receive Rs.10,000/-, in full satisfaction of the decree and the amount also has been paid in the presence of the panchayatdars on the representation of the decree-holder that he would report to the Court for recording full satisfaction, but as the same was not done by the decree- holder, he has moved the Court under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code to pass orders by terminating the Execution Petition and recording full satisfaction. THE learned District Munsif without even taking the petition on file has rejected the same on the ground that under Order 21, Rule 2 (2-A) and (3), unless the payment has been certified, the full satisfaction could be recorded and therefore the petition was not maintainable.

(2.) THE learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner Mr.Abdul Wahab would contend that under Order 21, Rule 2 (2-A), and 2(3), of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court cannot record satisfaction of the payments, only if such payments were not made as mentioned under these provisions, but in this case the payment was not by these modes, but without any records in the presence of the panchayatdars and therefore Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code is applicable to enquire whether the discharge has been made or not, but the learned District Munsif without considering the scope of Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code has rejected the petition and therefore the order is illegal. It is true Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code reads that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. Amendment to code of Civil Procedure has been made in 1976 introducing sub- rule 2-A to Order 21, making it compulsory for recording satisfaction, and only if the payments were made in the modes mentioned under Order 21, Rule 1 and sub-rule 2-A the satisfaction could be recorded. Order 21, Rule 1 reads as follows:- Modes of paying money under decree:- All money, payable under a decree shall be paid as follows, namely: (a) by deposit into the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, sent to that Court by postal money order or through a bank; or (b) out of Court, to the decree-holder by postal money order or through a bank or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing; or (c) otherwise, as the Court which made the decree, directs. Order 21, Sub-rule (2-A) reads as follows: No payment or adjustment shall be recorded at the instance of the judgment-debtor unless - (a) the payment is made in the manner, provided in rule 1; or (b) the payment or adjustment is proved by the documentary evidence; or (c) the payment or adjustment is admitted by, or on behalf of, the decree-holder in his reply to the notice given under sub- rule (2) of rule 1, or before the Court. Sub-rule (3) reads that "A payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as afore-said, shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree". At a glance of these rules, we can easily understand that the Court cannot record or recognize the payments unless the payments were made in the modes mentioned under these rules. But the learned counsel for the petitioner M.Abdul Wahab contended that under sub-rule (3), the payment shall not be recorded, only if the payment or adjustment was not made in the manner mentioned under sub-rule (2-A), (a), (b) and (c) and as the revision petitioner herein has not made payment under these modes, sub- rule (2-A) is not applicable for this case. Further, he would contend that when Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code specifically reads that the discharge can be considered by the executing Court, the lower Court ought to have considered the plea of the revision petitioner. From the purport of sub-rule (2-A), it is made clear that the payment or adjustment shall not be recorded by the Court unless the payment was made in the manner provided under Rule 1 or payment or adjustment was proved by any documentary evidence or the payment or adjustment is admitted by the decree-holder himself. So, the above rules are exhaustive with regard to the mode of payment for recording satisfaction. THE learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that this petition under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code is not for recording the satisfaction, but to declare that the entire decree amount has been discharged and therefore sub-rule (2-A) cannot be invoked. However, sub-rule (3) prohibits not only the recording of the satisfac tion but the recognition of the payment itself as it reads that "a payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorced as aforesaid, shall not be recognized by any Court" would indicate that the recording of payment by the Court shall be done only for the payments made in the modes mentioned above and all other payments shall not be recognized by the Court in execution the decree. When the recognition of the payment itself is not allowed under sub-rule (3), if the payment was made in any oth er manner, there is no question to give a finding that the entire decree amount in this case is discharged, because the Court cannot recognize such payments said to have been made by the revision petitioner herein in the presence of the panchayatdars orally. THErefore, as the contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is against the purport of sub-rule (2-A), the Court below is perfectly correct in rejecting the petition. In view of the sub-rule introduced in the amendment in 1976, the clause under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code relating to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree, has become redundant. As I find that the order of the Court below is perfectly correct, there is no justification for interference and the revision is dismissed. No costs.