B C S ENTERPRISES Vs. ASHOK KUMAR LUNIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS revision is against the order of the learned VII judge of Court of Small Causes (Appellate Authority) under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 confirming the order of the Rent Controller, Madras, permitting for the amendment of the pleadings. The respondent/tenant is the revision petitioner. The landlord filed the petition for eviction of the revision petitioner, who is his tenant, under Section 10 (2) (i) and also for additional accommodation under Section 10 (3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control act, 1960,) herein after to be referred to as the Act. He has not specifically pleaded that the hardship that the respondent may likely to suffer is much less when compared to the hardship which he would be facing if the additional accommodation was not granted and he would be put to un told sufferings and hardships. Therefore, he filed the petition M. P. No. 682 of 1991 in R. C. O. P. No. 2205 of 1989 on the file of the Rent Controller for amendment of the petitioner to include a paragraph specifically mentioning that his hardship will be more than the hardship that may likely to occur to the tenant in the event of the additional accommodation is not granted. THIS petition was resisted by the tenant respondent contending that there is no provision under the Act to amend the pleading and therefore, the amendment could not be allowed. The Rent Controller, rejecting the contention of the tenant, allowed the petition for amendment. THIS was challenged by the tenant before the learned Appellate Authority under the Act and he also has agreed with the view taken by the Rent Controller and dismissed the appeal.

(2.) THE learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner Mr. Balasubramaniam would contend that even though the Courts have held that the Rent Controller has inherent powers to permit for the amendment of the mistakes committed by inadvertence, there is no provision under the Act empowering the Rent Controller to allow the amendment of the pleadings of the parties and therefore, the amendment allowed by the courts below is illegal and is liable to be set aside. THE learned counsel draws support from the decision of this Court in Munisamy Naidu v. Kasim Khan (1971 (II) Madras Law Journal 379) wherein it is specifically held that the Rent Controller is not entitled to order for the amendment of the petition. He also relies upon the decision in m/s. Venson Transports v. Vaidehi Ammal (99 Law weekly 706) where in also it is repreated that the Rent Controller has the inherent power only to amend the door number occurring due to the inadvertence. In both these decisions, this court has taken the view that the Rent Controller is not a court and he being the personal designate, has no power to order for amendment when such power has not been conferred upon him. THE learned counsel Mr. Balasubramaniam refers to another decision of this Court in Mohammed v. State of Tamil Nadu (1984 (I)M. L. J. 326) wherein also the view taken by this Court is that the Rent controller has not been conferred the status of a civil Court. But the later pronouncements of this Court are that the Rent Controller is also a court. In Arya vysia Samajam v. Murugesa Mudaliar (1990 T. L. N. J. 82) the Division Bench of this court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable for condonation of the delay in bringing the legal representatives of the parties in the rent control proceedings. In a recent decision in Raju v. Mohamadabai (1993 (1) M. L. J. 290) the view expressed by this Court is that the Rent controller is a court and not a mere persona designate. Considering the nature of the adjudication, the way in which the powers are exercised and the rights of the landlord and the tenant are adjudicated in respect of the premises governed by the Act, the proceedings before the Rent Controller is found to be of civil nature involving the rights of the parties. THE court has observed that as the decision of the Rent Controller is appealable to the Appellate authority, which is a judicial authority and the order passed by the Rent controller is executable as if it were a decree, it is clear that the Rent controller cannot be considered to be a persona designata. THE Andhra Pradesh high Court also in G. D. M. Rao v. Ranga Panajah & Bros. (AIR. 1975 Andhra pradesh 13) has held that the Rent Controller acting under the Rent Control Act is a court and Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the proceedings. In Vidya Devi v. Firm Madan Lal (AIR 1971 Punjab 6 Haryana 150), the Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the Rent controller and the Appellate Authority are civil Courts for the purpose of sections 195 (1) (b), 476 and 479-A of the old Code of Criminal Procedure. But the learned counsel Mr. Balasubramaniam contended that in the later decisions of this court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court, only for the purpose of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Rent Controller is considered to be a civil Court and similarly only for the purposes of Sections 195 (1) (b), 476 and 479-A of Old Code of Criminal Procedure, for the offence of perjury, the Rent Controller was considered to be court but as these decisions are only for the limited scope of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 195 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the Rent controller cannot be treated as a Civil Court for all purposes especially for amendment of the pleadings when already this court has found in the decision cited above that the Rent Controller has no powers to order amendment. Even though in Raju v. Mohamadabi (referred supra), the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act was the primary consideration, the nature of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the Civil rights adjudicated before the rent Controller and the enforcement of the order of Rent Controller by execution an if it were a decree have been thoroughly considered by this court and therefore, it has held that the Rent Controller is a civil Court. As the bench of this court also has taken the sake view, in Arya Vysia Samajam v. Murugesa Mudaliar (referred supra), it cannot be contended that is view is confined only to the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not for other purposes. I am unable to subscribe my support to this argument of the learned counsel Mr. Balasubramaniam. When the adjudication before the Rent controller relates to the rights of the parties, which are in civil nature, and the order of Rent Controller also is an executable order, certainly the view of this court that the Rent Controller is a Court has to be accepted for all purposes. As the earlier view of this Court that the Rent Controller is a persona designata has been given up and the Rent Controller also is treated as a court, then the powers of a court have to be considered with reference to the object of it's functioning.