LAWS(MAD)-1995-10-80

KUPPUSWAMI Vs. GOVINDARASU

Decided On October 13, 1995
KUPPUSWAMI Appellant
V/S
Govindarasu Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard. Both the Courts below had unanimously held that the plaintiffs claim for the recovery of the suit amount on the basis of promissory note Ex. A-1 has been proved amply as relied on by Ex. A-1 the promissory note dated 2-10-87 with the notice under Ex. A-2 and reply under Ex. A-3 and then another discharge promissory note under Ex. A-4 coupled with the oral evidence of P.W.1, the plaintiff, P.W.2, the attestor of Ex. A-1 and P.W.3, the scribe. It is thus seen that the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff clearly demonstrates the suit transaction having taken place and the liability existed upon the defendant to discharge. The defence mainly seems to be one of total denial. But, however, the previous transaction covered under Ex. A-4 seems to have been admitted and having laid the source upon Ex. A-4, a defence was set in to say that the suit transaction is a renewal of the earlier one and not in existence at any point of time. Having considered the whole tenor of oral and legal evidence, the trial court on framing four issues, inclusive of the law of limitation and the suit negotiable instrument vitiated with the material alteration has felt that the said defence is not proved and established and the plaintiffs claim has been fully established. The appellate court entirely agrees with the finding of the learned trial Judge. However, under the circumstances, it was the strenuous effort of the Bar by Mr. V. Raghavachari, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that some discrepancies in the claim of P.Ws. 2 and 3 on the one hand and P.W.1 on the other tilted the whole balance in favour of the appellant and that therefore, it was persuaded by him to treat it as substantial question of law very much involved in this second appeal. For the reasoning stated above, I am totally unable to endorse my view with the learned counsel for the appellant for the mere reasoning that the minor discrepancies if any happened during the past or during the trial in my considered view, amount to mere extraneous considerations not relevant to the very points involved in the suit as per the settled proposition of law by now on the negotiable instruments concerned. As was clearly laid down by the appellate Judge, if such extraneous considerations are to be taken, it will go to the root of the case of the plaintiff. Then the onus clearly lies upon the appellant to discharge and establish before the court which in the instant case is totally lacking and absent, with the result, that exists into substantial question of law to be probed in the second appeal by getting it admitted.

(2.) For the seasonings afore-mentioned, I am at every difficulty to point out the substantial question of law made available for further probe by admitting the second appeal. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed. CMP. No. 9677 of 1995 is also dismissed. Appeal dismissed.