R L NARASIMHAN Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these writ petitions, the Petitioners, though different, have prayed for the issue of writs of certiorari to quash the orders dt. 23-5-1979,16-10-1980 and 30-10-1980 passed by the second respondent herein in Cases Nos.15/1385/Tambaram, 16/1385/ Tambaram and 17/1385/Tambaram respectively. The facts giving rise to these writ petitions may be briefly stated as under: All the petitioners own lands in No. 166, Tambaram village. The Petitioner in W.P. No. 2569 of 1979 owned a total extent of 42 grounds and 1131 sq. ft. situate in Survey Nos. 330/2C, 331/2C, 274/2 and 274/7 and comprised in Patta No. 778. An extent of 42 grounds and 694 sq. ft. was owned by the petitioner in W.P. No. 6395 of 1980 in four survey numbers 274/3, 274/6, 330/2D and 331/2D in Patta No. 779.42 grounds and 1130 sq.ft. comprised in Survey Nos. 274/4,330/2B and 331/2A were owned by the petitioners in W.P. No. 6919 of 1980 in Patta No. 780. All these lands owned by the petitioners are registered as dry lands in the revenue records. The provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) were made applicable to the area where the lands of the petitioners are situate on and from 1-7-1975 as per S.1-A of the Act. The petitioners submitted a return as required under S.7-C of the Act and since the returns so filed were found to be defective in respect of valuation, an enquiry was held under S.10(2) of the Act. In the course of the enquiry the petitioners claimed that the classification of the lands as dry in the village accounts was incorrect as crops had been grown on these lands and as such, the provisions of the Act will not apply to the lands in question. Thereupon, the petitioners were granted time to produce extracts from the adangal for five faslis prior to 1385 to establish that the lands were under cultivation prior to the application of the Act with effect from 1-7-1975. Certain adangal extracts for faslis 1381 to 1385 issued by the Tahsildar, Saidapet, were also produced by the petitioners to establish that the lands in question were under cultivation and therefore fell outside the scope of the provisions of the Act. Some objections were also raised by the petitioners to some of the entries found in the adangal extracts. An account book was also relied upon to establish the incurring of expenses in connection with the agricultural operations carried on in the lands in question. An objection was raised that as the municipality had not levied property tax and vacant land tax, the lands had to be treated as having been used for agricultural purposes. The second respondent, while proceeding to consider the aforesaid objections raised by the petitioners, held that (i) the lands in question had not been cultivated for a period of five years before the commencement of the Act and proved to be continued to be so cultivated and entered as such in the Government accounts as per G.O.Ms. No.3526, Revenue Department, dt. 15th June, 1973 as the adangal entries showed that there was no cultivation during Faslis 1382, 1383 and 1384 and therefore the lands will not qualify for exemption from the levy of Urban Land Tax and (ii) that the value of the Urban land could be justly and reasonably fixed at Rs. 4,000/- per ground for Survey Nos. 330/2C, 330/2D, 331/2D, 330/2B and 331/2A and at Rs. 800/- per ground for Survey Nos. 274/2, 274/3, 274/4, 274/6 and 274/7. On the conclusions arrived at as aforesaid, the first respondent proceeded to levy Urban Land Tax on the petitioners at the prescribed rates. It is the correctness of these orders of assessment so passed by the second respondent that is questioned in these writ petitions.

(2.) During the pendency of W.P. Nos. 2569 of 1979 and 6395 of 1980, the petitioners therein died and their legal representatives have been brought on record by orders dt. 7-7-1983 in W.M.P. No. 1962/1982 and 8-3-1984 in W.M.P. No. 1959 of 1983 respectively.

(3.) In support of these writ petitions, the learned counsel for the petitioners first contended, drawing attention to the definition of "Urban Land" under S.2(13). of the Act, that both wet lands and dry lands would be agricultural lands and that the exclusion of wet lands only from the scope of the definition of 'Urban Land" would be discriminatory. The learned counsel also submitted that the same class of property viz., agricultural land similarly situate is subjected to a differential treatment for purposes of the Act, in that, the wet lands alone are excluded from the purview of the Act, while dry lands are taken in. Reliance was placed in this connection by the learned counsel upon certain observations in the decision of the Supreme Court in Konnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 at P. 557. Attention in this connection was also drawn to the decision in T. Sarojini Devi v. T.Sri Krishna, AIR 1944 Mad 401 and Commr. of Wealth-tax, Madras II v. P. Sankaran Nair 103 ITR 366 : (1976 Tax LR 1030) (Mad). On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that though wet and dry lands may both fall under the head "agricultural lands", yet, there is a well marked distinction between the two types of lands and that would justify the exclusion of one kind of agricultural land from the operation of the provisions of the Act and not the other. It was also further submitted that the Act being a taxation law, the State has a wide discretion in selecting the persons or objects and such a statute is not open to attack on the ground that it taxes dry lands and not wet lands. Reliance in this connection was placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of Utter Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1563, East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1733, Asst. Commr. of Urban Land Tax, Madras v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd., 75 ITR 603 and Jaipur Hosiery Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 26 STC 341. It was also contended that a taxing enactment is not open to challenge merely on the ground that the tax is harsh or excessive and reference was made in this connection to Hari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of India, 59 ITR 243.