ABRAHAM NADAR Vs. SPECIAL DEPUTY COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS batch of petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution and the writ appeals are directed against the notifications under Section 4 (1) as well as the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the first made in 1962 and the second in 1968 and January 1969. The public purpose mentioned in Section 4 (1) notifications was the development of Tuticorin Port or Tuticorin Harbour, establishment of industries, industrial estates, training centre construction of residential quarters. But in the declaration under Section 6 the purpose described was industrial development of Tuticorin area connected with Tuticorin Harbour project. The land sought to be acquired extended to several thousands of acres. The short grounds on which the validity of the notifications as well as the declaration are challenged, are that the public purpose mentioned in the notifications under Section 4 (1) was vague and lacked in particulars so as to enable the owners of lands to effectively file their objections to the purpose of acquisition under Section 5 -A, and that there was a change in the purpose of acquisition as mentioned in the declaration under Section 6.

(2.) MUNSHI Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150, held that the whole object of Section 5 -A would be defeated, if the public purpose was stated vaguely and without any indication of the nature of the purpose for which the land was being or was intended to be acquired. In that case, all that was mentioned as public purpose in the notification under Section 4 (1) was 'for planned development of the area.' The Supreme Court by an unanimous verdict held that the notification under Section 4 (1) was vitiated on account of vagueness. This judgment was noticed by a larger Bench in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077. The view in the earlier judgment was quoted apparently with approval, but with the observation that the question whether the purpose specified in a notification under Section 4 was sufficient to enable an objection to be filed under Section 5 -A, would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Actually, however, the second decision was rested not on the view in Munsif Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 1150 but on the ground of delay and laches or want of a plea at the earliest possible time. The court pointed out that the plea as to the vagueness of public purpose in the notification under Section 4 (1) was not raised in the writ petition, and that the writ petitions themselves were filed after a long delay. So, on the basis that the appellants before the appeals Supreme Court were not vigilant and had failed to take the precise plea at the earlier stage, the were dismissed.

(3.) APPLYING Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor Delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 the petitions as well as the appeals are dismissed. No costs. For the purpose of assessing the fee as between counsel and party, we fix fee Rs. 200 in each case.