(1.) THE scope and effect of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and of Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, arises the determination in these cases, except in one, where the point is whether the question of status or classification of an employee will also be within the ambit of Section 33c (2 ). The respondents, who are all transport workers governed by the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961, applied to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madurai, under Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computation in terms of money certain benefits and allowances they claim to be entitled to under the Motor Transport Workers Act. They claimed these allowances and benefits as having been in arrears by the employers over a number of years. A preliminary question was raised before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, by the employers that he had no jurisdiction under that section to compute in terms of money the benefits and allowances claimed, but that the workers should have invoked Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and asked for relief as in respect of delayed wages. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, repelled this contention and sustained his jurisdiction. This was also the case in Writ Appeal No. 290 of 1970. But the appellant there is a workman who is aggrieved by the finding of Ismail, J. that whether he belonged to the category of a clerk or an attender was a question not within the purview of Section Payment of Wage of the Industrial Disputes Act. On that view, the learned Judge allowed the petition out of which this appeal arises and that is how the workman is before us in that appeal.
(2.) THE Payment of Wages Act, 1936, was enacted to regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry. Wages are defined in that Act to cover all remuneration, whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise, expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed, which would be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment. The definition includes many other sources of remuneration, but excludes a certain variety of remuneration as far instance, bonus, the value of any house accommodation, travelling allowance and so on. Section 5 of that Act prescribes the time of payment of wages and the next section as to how wages should be paid, that is to say, in current coin or currency notes or in both. Section 7 provides how and in what cases deductions from wages are permissible. Section 8 provides for fines. Sections 9 to 13 also deal with deductions from wages. We have then Section 15 which provides for appointment of a Presiding Officer of a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or under any corresponding law, to he the authority to hear and decide for any specified area "all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area, including all matters incidental to such claims. " The jurisdiction thus afforded to the officer appointed under this section will extend to (1) all claims arising out of deductions from the wages and (2) delay in payment of wages. But an application for these two reliefs should be made within the time prescribed by the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15. These two reliefs, in order to ascertain their respective scope, will have to be determined in the light of the provisions we have referred to relating to the item for payment of wages and permissible deductions from wages. An appeal against an order dismissing either wholly or in part an application made under Section 15 (2) is provided for by Section 17. Section 17 (a) provides for enforcement of the order made under Section 15 (2 ). Section 20 makes any contravention of the provisions stated therein an offence punishable with fine. The procedure for trial of such offences has also been laid down by the Act and then there is a bar of a suit in any Court of law for recovery of wages or any deduction from wages in certain circumstances. We may mention that to transport workers, the Payment of Wages Act has been made applicable. Having regard to all these provisions, it seems to us that the scope of Section 15 is very limited and is circumscribed by the various provisions of the Act we have referred to. The scope, as we consider, is confined to only claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages and an application under Section 15 (2) has to be made within the time prescribed. In an application under Section 15 (2) what the officer concerned would be called upon to determine is whether, in the case of a claim for deduction, such deduction would be permissible under one or the other provisions of the Act and in the case of a claim for delayed wages, he would have to find whether the claimant for wages is entitled to the claim and whether the payment thereof was delayed in the context of the provision prescribing the time for payment of wages. It is true that wages, as defined in the Act, include wages expressed in terms of money, or capable of being so expressed. But where wages have not been expressed in terms of money, but are capable of being so expressed as in the case of allowance, it appears to us that no machinery for computing the allowances in terms of money has been specifically provided for. In our opinion, Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act cannot be invoked for the purpose, for, its scope is confined to deductions or delay in payment of wages. Under the guise of delay in payment of wages, it does not appear to us that the officer functioning under Section 15 can be called upon to ascertain the money value of allowances. That, as we consider, is not incidental to the question of delay in payment of wages.
(3.) ON that view of the matter, we consider that such a computation is competent only under Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. That provisions is wide enough to cover that relief and, in our opinion, there is nothing in common between the scope of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and that of Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Where jurisdiction is concurrent under different provisions in different enactments and the jurisdiction under one of those provisions is general and is of a larger scope, it may be possible to take the view that the general and wider jurisdiction should yield place to the special jurisdiction and that only after exhausting the latter, the general jurisdiction can be resorted. Equally, it may be said that, since the jurisdiction is concurrent, there is no legal bar to the wider jurisdiction being invoked without resorting to the special jurisdiction. But this aspect of the matter does not arise for our consideration in these cases, as we are of opinion that the scope of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and that of Section 33c (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act are not concurrent, but different the former being confined only to the two limited reliefs, which we have indicated. On that view, it would follow that Ismail, J. , came to the correct conclusion.