HEMALNATH Vs. B. KASTHURI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Civil Revision Petition is filed by the tenant against the order passed by the appellate authority, Second Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, directing his eviction on the ground that the landlady bona fide required the premises for additional accommodation and that the landlady is entitled to maintain the application as her husband was an employee in an essential service. In this Civil Revision Petition, a Civil Miscellaneous petition under Section 11 (4) of Act XVIII of 1960 praying that all further proceedings be stopped in the Civil Revision Petition and that a direction may be given that the landlady be put in possession, was also filed by the landlady. No counter -affidavit has been filed by the tenant as far as this petition is concerned.

(2.) THE Rent Controller found that the requirement of the landlady of the portion under the occupation of the tenant for additional accommodation was bona fide. Therefore, he allowed the petition of the landlady and directed eviction of the tenant. On appeal, the appellate authority confirmed the finding that the landlady bona fide required the premises for her own accommodation. Before the appellate authority it was contended on behalf of the tenant that the tenant is employed in the railway service, an essential service, and entitled to the benefit of Section 10 (4) of the Act, and that as the landlady is not employed in essential service, she is not entitled to have the tenant evicted. The appellate authority held that as the landlady's husband is in essential service, even though the landlady's husband is not the owner of the property, the requirement is for the benefit of the entire family and since the landlady's husband, who is the head of the family, is in essential service, that can be taken into consideration in finding that since the landlady's husband also is in essential service, the tenant is not entitled to the protection asked for.

(3.) IN the revision petition, Mr. Purushothaman, learned Counsel for the tenant, submitted that the landlady is not entitled to ask for eviction, as the landlady is not in essential service. Section 10 (4) of the Act provides that no order for eviction shall be passed under Sub -section (3) against any tenant who is engaged in any employment or class of employment, notified by the Government as an essential service for the purposes of that sub -section, unless the landlord is himself engaged in any employment or class of employment which has been so notified. It is not in dispute that the landlady's husband is employed in an essential service. The only question that arises is whether the section requires that the landlady herself should be employed in an essential service or whether the employment of her husband in the essential service is sufficient to confer benefit on her. Reading the section literally, it appears that the landlord should be employed in the essential service. But the word "landlord" in the various provisions of the Act has been given a wider meaning by Courts. In Saraswathi v. Vadivelu Chettiar : (1967)2MLJ81 , in construing the word "landlord occurring in Section 10 (3) (a) (iii), following the decisions reported in Kolaindavelu Chettiar v. Koolavana Chettiar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 184, and Kangu v. Ahmed Unnisa Begum : (1963)1MLJ97 , it was held that the landlord's requirement for his own occupation would include the requirement of his closer relatives, which would depend upon the social customs, habits, usage, practice, in the particular community, etc, The benefit conferred on the tenant belonging to an essential service, who is not liable to eviction, is taken away only when the landlord also belongs to an essential service. In construing the words, I feel that the Court will not be justified in giving a very restricted meaning to the word especially when the Courts have generally given a wider interpretation. "Landlord" is defined in Section 2 (6) as including a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another. In this case, the landlady's husband would have been perfectly entitled to receive the rent on behalf of his wife, and if the petition was filed on that basis, the husband would have claimed' as landlord and defeated the claim of the tenant that he is not liable to be evicted, as the husband is in the essential service itself. While the intention of the Act is to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenant, it was not intended to be harsh on the landlord, whose requirement was. genuine. It would be contrary to all established customs and usages prevalent in the society to hold that the husband's, requirement is not the requirement of the wife, or the exemption to which the husband is entitled is not available to the wife. As already pointed out, by appropriate pleadings, the plea of the tenant could have been successfully resisted. Taking all these circumstances into account, I agree with the appellate authority that the words "landlord is himself engaged in any employment or class of employment which has been so notified" should be construed to include landlady's husband being engaged in essential service. I do not see any ground for not accepting the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority.