LAWS(MAD)-1965-1-4

K R THANGAPANDIAN Vs. KUCHU BOMMA NAICKER

Decided On January 05, 1965
K.R.THANGAPANDIAN Appellant
V/S
KUCHU BOMMA NAICKER Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Letters Patent appeal has been instituted by one K. R. Thangapandian, the second respondent in certain proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act (Act 8 of 1890), in the Court of the learned District Judge, Tiruchirapalli, and the appellant before Ramakrishnan, J. , in A. A. O. 103 of 1963. The background of facts in regard to which the proceedings arose in the District Court itself, has been succinctly set forth in the judgment of the learned Judge. A great deal of the previous history will be found stated in Ponnalagu Ammal v. State of Madras, in the judgment delivered by Rajamannar, Chief Justice, on behalf of the Bench. For the purpose of the present proceeding, which does involve certain questions of interest upon the applicability of specific provisions of the guardian and Wards Act to the facts, the matter might be taken up from the stage in the history, at which there was a dispute with regard to rival adoptions--the adoption by Ponnalgu Ammal of a minor as heir to the Marungapuri Estate in 1949, and the adoption by the other widow of the Zamindar, one Lakshmi ammani. This dispute was brought up to this Court, which directed the Court of wards in Administration of the estate to file an interpleader suit. Actually, at the stage of the history of the litigation, the rival adoption by the other widows, lakshmi Ammani, had not taken place; but there was a dispute between the widows themselves, which forms the subject of controversy. The interpleader suit filed in accordance with the directions of this Court, was O. S. 28 of 1953 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruchirapalli. It resulted in a compromise decree, the crucial clauses of which have been extracted and set forth by the learned Judge (Ramakrishnan, J.) in his judgment.

(2.) IT is beyond dispute that, at the time of the compromise decree, both adoptions had taken place, and the decree actually provided for an equitable settlement, which, in virtual effect, recognised the validity of both. Briefly stated, under the decree, each minor was given a 61/2 anna share in the estate, ultimately in the form of specific and allotted properties. Ponnalagu Ammani, the first respondent in the present proceedings in the District Court, was herself given a three anna share. The present appellant, the natural father of the minor adopted by Ponnalagu Ammani, was given certain rights of guardianship, recognised by certain clauses of the consent decree. He was appointed guardian ad litem, and the decree provided that he could administer the properties allotted to the minor, on behalf of the minor, until the minor came of age. The present original petition for appointment of a guardian for this minor by Court, on alleged grounds of maladministration and misfeasance by the appellant (K. R. Thangapandian, the natural father of the minor), was instituted, under S. 10 of the Guardians and wards Act No. 8 of 1890, in brief, it was a prayer by a person purporting to be a distant relative of the minor, and acting on his behalf and for his benefit, to appoint a third party guardian for the estate.

(3.) THIS proceeding involves certain grounds of considerable interest as we earlier observed, upon the impact of specific provisions of Act 8 of 1890, hereinafter called the Act, on the facts of the case. There is an objection in the nature of a preliminary objection, urged by the appellant. This is, briefly, that the petitioner in the proceedings is not "any relative or friend of the minor" under S. 8 (b) of the Act. The relationship is disputed. In any event, considerable hostility of interest is alleged, as between this person and the minor, and the ground is that this person cannot be herd at all, even to claim that a third party should be appointed as property guardian of the minor under S. 7 of the Act read with S. 10. The further question of fact and law which arises in the case is whether the clause in the consent decree that we have earlier referred to, would invest the appellant with the capacity of "a guardian. . . . appointed by will or other instrument or appointed or declared by Court" within the scope of S. 7 (3) of the Act. If the appellant is such a guardian, indisputably, the Court will have no power to appoint someone else as guardian, until the power to appoint someone else as guardian, until the powers of the appellant as guardian have ceased under any of the provisions of the Act, including the provision for removal.