ANNAMALAI AND CO. LTD., A PRIVATE COMPANY BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR, S. RM. CT. A. ANNAMALAI CHETTIAR Vs. C.H. SIBGATHULLA SAHEB BY POWER-OF-ATTORNEY AGENT, M.S. MAHADEVA IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE three appeals are from the judgment of Rajagopalan, J., in Civil Suit No. 132 of 1948. The fifth Defendant is the Appellant in Original Side Appeal No. 131 of 1951, and the second Defendant is the Appellant in Original Side Appeal No. 29 of 1952. The suit was for the recovery of possession of pieces of vacant land in Original Suit No. 27 corresponding to Re -survey No. 4693 in Thyagarayanagar, Madras, in the separate possession of Defendants, of whom there were seven. These plots were comprised in a big block of 8 cawnies, 7 grounds, 2,160 square feet, which originally was situated in the zamindari village of Mambalam. The Sri Parthasarathy Swami temple, Triplicane, owned this block of land in inam. The Plaintiff purchased this entire block from the temple by a sale deed, dated 14th March 1947. The title of the temple and the Plaintiff as the vendee from the temple is not disputed. The said lands appear to have been originally leased to one Balu Mudali, and after his death, they were in the occupation of his son, Ramaswami Mudali, after, whose death the lands came to be occupied by his sons. Subsequently, the sons, evidently as a result of a partition, were in separate occupation and enjoyment of portions of the said block. The Defendants were alienees from the descendants of one or other of the sons of Ramaswami. The Defendants raised several defences, namely, that the suit lands were ryoti lands in an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act, that they were entitled to rights of permanent occupancy, that they were tenants within the meaning of the City Tenants Protection Act, entitled to the benefit of Sections 9 and 11 of the Act and the suit should fail because of the absence of valid notices under Section 11 of that Act, and that the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The learned Judge, who tried the suit, Rajagopalan, J., passed a decree for possession against Defendants 1, 2, 4 and 5. The suit had been dismissed against Defendants 6 and 7, and there was a consent decree against the third Defendant. Original Side Appeal No. 131 of 1951, and Original Side Appeal No. 29 of 1952 are appeals against this decision of Rajagopalan, J., by Defendants 5 and 2 respectively. Defendant 5 filed an application under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act for a direction to the Plaintiff to sell him the lands in his occupation for a price, to be fixed by the Court. That application was dismissed and Original Side Appeal No. 32 of 1951, is against the order dismissing it.

(2.) ON behalf of the Appellants, no objection was taken to the finding of the learned Judge that the Defendants had failed to prove that they were entitled to permanent rights of occupancy under the Madras Estates Land Act. The main contention on behalf of the Appellants before us was that they were entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act. This contention was practically founded on the decision in a prior suit, Civil Suit No. 758 of 1936, on the file of the Madras City Civil Court. It is, therefore, necessary to set out the circumstances under which that suit was filed and what exactly was decided in that suit. That suit was filed by the trustees of Sri Parthasarathy Swami temple, Triplicane, against the descendants of Balu Mudali for recovery of possession of the entire block of 8 cawnies odd. It was stated in the plaint that the trustees of the temple had granted a lease to the four sons of Ramaswami mentioned above in fasli 1292, and that they were in occupation of the lands as tenants and after them their descendants and heirs had been likewise holding and enjoying the lands as tenants and that the tenancy of the Defendants had been determined by notices to quit. The main defence was that the Defendants were entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act. There was also a plea of misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The learned City Civil Judge dismissed the suit on the ground that, as framed, it was not maintainable, because there were separate tenancies and the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The learned Judge, however, held that the Defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the City Tenants Protection Act. There was an appeal to this Court which was heard and disposed of by Patanjali Sastri, J., as he then was. The learned Judge held, differing from the City Civil Judge, that the suit as framed, was not vitiated by misjoinder of parties and causes of action; but he held, also differing from the learned trial Judge, that the suit should fail because of the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act. The chief reason why the City Civil Judge held that the Defendants were not entitled to the benefits of the Act was that it did not apply to the lands in suit, as they were not part of the City of Madras at the time the Act was passed. Patanjali Sastri, J., took a different view and held that the Act was applicable to the lands in suit. Another objection raised by the Plaintiffs was that there were no buildings or superstructures on the entire lands and that some portions of the land had been let for building purposes and other portions for cultivation, and in any event, the Act could apply only to that portion of the land which had been let for building purposes. The learned Judge overruled the objection on the ground that no differentiation could be made between lands let for building and lands let for cultivation and that the whole block of land should be treated as a single item of property and as there were buildings on portions of the land, the Act would apply to the entire block and as the requirements of Section 11 of the Act had not been complied with, the suit should fail. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. The trustees of the temple filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Patanjali Sastri, J. This was dismissed by a Divisional Bench consisting of Sir Lionel Leach, C.J., and Lakshmana Rao, J. The learned Judges agreed with Patanjali Sastri, J., on both points, namely, misjoinder and the application of the Act.

(3.) THERE is one important difference between the prior suit and the present suit. In the prior suit, the Defendants were the descendants of the original lessees and the suit was in respect of the entire block of land on which admittedly there were superstructures. The present suit, however, is only against some of the persons occupying portions of the land, and it is common ground that there are no superstructures on the lands which form the subject -matter of the present suit. It was represented to us that the Plaintiff had dealt with the persons who were alienees of the portions of the land on which there were superstructures on the footing that they were tenants entitled to the benefits of the City Tenants Protection Act. The Plaintiff's contention was that so far as the contesting Defendants are concerned, they would not be tenants within the meaning of the Act, because there were no buildings on the lands in their occupation.