LAWS(MAD)-1945-1-47

DECEASED THAZHETHERANJOLI KOZHIPRO ACHUTHAN NAYARS HEIRS AND CHILDREN VOLA VEETTIL KOTTAPURATH JANAKI AMMA AND ANR. Vs. TAZHETHERANJOLI KOZHIPRO RAMAN NAYAR AND ORS.

Decided On January 30, 1945
Deceased Thazhetheranjoli Kozhipro Achuthan Nayars Heirs And Children Vola Veettil Kottapurath Janaki Amma And Anr. Appellant
V/S
Tazhetheranjoli Kozhipro Raman Nayar And Ors. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question is whether the appellants, born of an ordinary Marumakattayam union, are entitled to inherit the self -acquired property of their deceased father. Both the Courts held that they were not.

(2.) THE law of intestacy ordinarily applied to those who follow the Marumakattayam system is that the self -acquired property of a male passes to his tarwad upon his death. It has always been held that the customary union between persons subject to the Marumakattayam law is not a legal marriage and that, consequently, the offspring are not legitimate children who can claim to inherit their father's property under the ordinary Hindu law. Act IV of 1896 made such unions legal marriages provided that they were registered, with the effect of making children both before and after the registration legitimate. Act XXII of 1933 went a step further and recognised such unions whether they were registered or not, provided that the union:

(3.) THE learned advocate for the appellants argues that this could not have been the intention of the legislature; for the offspring of a union recognised by the Act of 1896 would not then have the benefit of the present Act if the mother had died before the Act of 1933 came into force. That, however, is not the case. If children were born of a marriage recognised by the Act of 1896 they would be legitimate children and would therefore be entitled to inherit property under Section 19. I have been referred to Section 30 of the Act which deals with the devolution of property upon the death intestate of a male not following the Maru -makattayam system; but we are not concerned with such a case. I do not find anything in Section 30 which makes it improbable that the Legislature intended that Section 4 and Section 19 should be read according to their plain wording. It is further argued that if Section 19 applies only to legitimate children, Section 50 would be unnecessary. That, too, is not the case; for section SO is of wide application and does not and is not meant to apply only to the rights of children under Section 19.