(1.) THE second defendant is the appellant in this case. The properties in the suit were sold by the first defendant to the plaintiff on the gth July, 1941. The plaintiff lost the sale deed on the 29th July, 1941, and filed the suit for specific performance on the 14th August, 1941, alleging the loss of the sale deed, and asking for the execution of a fresh sale deed and for possession of the properties. To this suit, he impleaded the second defendant who took a subsequent sale from the first defendant of the properies with knowledge of the plaintiff's sale'. The sale deed -to the second defendant was executed on the 16th July, 1941, and registered on the 23rd July, 1941. Before the suit proceeded to trial however the plaintiff recovered his lost sale deed and got it registered on the 22nd September, 1941. Both the lower Courts have given a decree to the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the properties negativing the second defendant's contention that he is entitled to priority because his sale deed was registered earlier than the plaintiff's sale deed. Section 50 of the Registration Act has no application to the facts before us because there is no competition between a registered and an unregistered document. The competition now is between two registered documents, the plaintiff's being the earlier document but registered later and the second defendant's being the later one : but registered earlier. Having regard to the terms of Section 47 of the Registration Act, there is no doubt about the answer to be given as to which of these two documents has to be given priority over the other. The later document, though registered earlier, must be postponed to the earlier document and that is what was laid down in Marayanav. Laxuman, I.L.R. (1904) Bom. 42 and Surendranath Ghosh v. Haridas Biswas , I.L.R.(1932) 60 Cal. 225.
(2.) IT was however urged by Mr. Bhashyamthatonthe date of the suit the competition was as between a person who had an unregistered sale deed in his favpur and his client who had a registered sale deed, though of a later date. This is true; but on the discovery of the sale deed and its registration, the position materially changed in favour of the plaintiff and the suit, even though there was no formal amendment, must be regarded as one brought by the plaintiff on the basis of a registered, sale deed in his favour dated the 9th July, 1941. Viewed in this light the question of notice becomes immaterial. Even if the second defendant is able to show that he purchased the properties bona fide without notice of the earlier sale deed, he cannot succeed unless, of course, the earlier transferee is prevented from setting up his title as against the later transferee by any infirmative circumstances such as fraud pr estoppel. The question is really concluded by Section 47 of the Registration Act and Section 48 of the Transfer of Property Act. The law gives four months' period for registration and if the document is registered within that date, the subsequent transferee cannot be heard to say that as he got his document without notice, and during this period allowed to the earlier transferee, got his own document registered he must be deemed to be a bona fide purchaser for value. Such a plea, if allowed, would lead to much fraud. If a later document registered earlier is to prevail over an earlier document registered later it would always be easy for the vendor and the later purchaser to enter into a transaction within the time given for registration of the earlier document and get the new deed registered immediately and thus defeat the purchaser under the earlier deed. The correct proposition is set down in the following short passsage in Mulla's Indian Registration Act under Section 47: