LAWS(MAD)-2015-11-185

ASSISTANT PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND APPELLATE TRIBUNAL

Decided On November 04, 2015
ASSISTANT PROVIDENT FUND COMMISSIONER Appellant
V/S
PRESIDING OFFICER EMPLOYEES PROVIDENT FUND APPELLATE TRIBUNAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Mr. R. Meenakshi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

(2.) The petitioner, who was respondent in the appeal petition, filed a counter statement inter alia, apart from placing facts, contending that financial crunch alone will not be sufficient for wavering penal damages for depositing provident fund contribution. In support of such contention, reliance was placed upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan limes Ltd. v. Union of India, 1998 78 FLR 332 (SC). Further, the petitioner contended that the word 'default' in section 14-B of the Act means non-payment of obligation by a party bound to pay and it also includes omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual duty and will embrace the idea of dishonesty and the omission of law is discreditable.

(3.) The appellate Tribunal heard the matter and after taking note of sections 14-B and section 32-A of the Act, pointed out that the power to impose damages under section 14-B is a judicial power and it confers a discretion upon the Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages not exceeding the amount of arrears within the ceiling that is imposed by the statute and the nature of power conferred on him is quasi judicial. Further, it was pointed out that neither Regulation 32-A nor Regulation 32-B can be regarded as inflexible, while levying the damages. Due consideration is required to be given to the situation which led to default in remittance of dues by the employer. That apart, the Tribunal has given certain other factual reasons as well as relied on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Petrolight (India) Ltd. v. Regional Director, 1994 AIR(SC) 521. Ultimately the Tribunal did not grant full relief to the second respondent but restricted the damages to 5% per annum.