LAWS(MAD)-2005-6-140

UNION OF INDIA Vs. CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

Decided On June 29, 2005
UNION OF INDIA Appellant
V/S
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AGGRIEVED by the common order passed by Central Administrative tribunal dated 21-7-2000 in Original Application Nos. 1133 and 1134 of 1999; and dated 24-1-2001 in Review Applications, Additional Commissioner, Central excise and another preferred the above Writ Petitions. Since the question raised and the claim of the contesting 2nd respondent is one and the same in both the Writ Petitions and a common order was passed by the Central administrative Tribunal, they (Writ Petitions) are being disposed of by the following common order.

(2.) IT is seen from the affidavit of Additional commissioner, Central Excise, Chennai that the Office of the Commissioner of central Excise, Chennai-I is responsible for the cadre control in respect of group-B and C staff of the entire Central Excise and Customs Commissionerates in Tamil Nadu excepting Customs House and Airport. The responsibility extends to recruitment, inter- commissionerate posting and transfer, cadre management, etc. For computerisation of work in the department, cadre of Data Entry Operator ( DEO ) was created and recruitment is made by the Department as and when vacancies arise. The Central Excise Commissionerates at Chennai, Coimbatore, Madurai and Trichy have a total strength of 251 DEOs in different grades and they are working in different Commissionerates. The cadre control Commissionerate is responsible for distribution of DEOs in different grades, keeping track of actual number of officers working against the sanctioned strength, filling up of vacancies and maintenance of percentage of reservation for SC/st etc.

(3.) SINCE we have already narrated the required facts, there is no need to refer the same once again. Both the Central Government standing counsel by drawing our attention to the Original Order of the Tribunal dated 21-7-2000, would submit that the Tribunal failed to see that the order that was challenged before it is the relieving order dated 15-11-1999 and not the termination order dated 11-11-99. There is an error apparent and without looking into the said material aspect, the Tribunal committed an error in arriving a conclusion that the department had not assigned any reason in the relieving order. It is not disputed by the learned Central Government Standing counsel for the second respondent in both the Writ Petitions that both of them were terminated by order dated 11-11-99. For convenience we refer the order of termination of Mr M. S. Hemakumar , 2nd respondent in W. P. No. 5265/2001 which reads as under: "order of termination of service issued under the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary service) Rules, 1965. In pursuance of the Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, I, B. S. V. MURTHY, Additional Commissioner (P & V), hereby terminate forthwith the services of Shri M. S. HEMAKUMAR , Data Entry Operator Gr.'a' and that he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of notice at the same rates at which he was drawing then immediately before termination of his service, or, as the case may be, for the period by which notice falls short of one month. Station: Chennai-34, ( Sd. x x xx) Date: 11-11-1999. ( B. S. V. MURTHY) Additional Commissioner ( P& v )" The said order makes it clear that based on Proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, the competent authority, namely, Additional Commissioner P and V terminated the services of Hemakuma r , 2nd respondent in W. P. N o. 5265/2001 from the post of Data Entry Operator, grade'a'. The said order also shows that in lieu of notice he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to pay/allowances which he was drawing immediately before his termination of service. Rule 5 of the said Rules speaks about termination of temporary service. Rule 5 (1) (a) enables the Government to terminate the services of a temporary Government servant at any time by notice ii n writing by the appointing authority. The notice period is prescribed as one month. However, if the appointing authority or the authority decided to terminate the service of the temporary Government servant, the said Government servant is entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. The Proviso also provides procedure to be adopted by the appointing authority while serving notice on such Government servant. The termination order dated 11-11-1999 contains the relevant enabling provision to the Government and also refers the competent authority, namely, Additional commissioner who is empowered under the Rule to terminate the services of a temporary Government servant. The order also satisfies compensation by way of one month's salary and allowance in lieu of notice. We are satisfied that the termination order dated 11-11-99 satisfies all the conditions prescribed in rule 5 of the Rules. Admittedly, the second respondent in both the writ petitions have not challenged the order of termination dated 11-11-99. Instead, they challenged the relieving order dated 15-11-99 which no doubt does not contain the required conditions as stated in Rule 5. Unfortunately, the tribunal, without referring to the termination order dated 11-11-99, proceeded as if that the relieving order dated 15-11-99 is the original order, terminating the service of the applicants and erroneously found that the same is a non-speaking order and therefore the same is liable to be set aside. It is unfortunate that when the factual error was brought to the notice of the tribunal by the department by filing Review Applications Nos. 63 and 69/2000, again the Tribunal committed the same error in dismissing both the applications. We sustain the first contention raised by the department.