STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. M JAYAPAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first respondent went before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.7409 of 1996 challenging the charge memo dated 13.10.1996 served on him. THE Tribunal quashed that charge memo. THE Government is therefore before this court in this writ petition. Heard the learned counsel on either side.

(2.) THE order in challenge shows that on the same set of facts, the first respondent and another were proceeded with in S.C.NO.92 of 1992 on the file of Special Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sivaganga for offences under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. THE impugned order also shows that the said case ended in acquittal by judgment dated 16.9.1994. THEre is no dispute that the said judgment had become final. THE Tribunal perusing the copy of the judgment and the contents of the charge memo found that the facts relied upon in the charge memo are the same facts, on which the first respondent was tried before the Special Court and therefore the acquittal by the criminal court cannot be easily lost sight of in deciding as to whether the departmental proceedings should be allowed to commence. On that premises, the Tribunal held that to allow the departmental proceedings to go on, on the same set of facts on which criminal prosecution was launched, would be an exercise in futility. Learned counsel appearing for the State relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in CORPORATION OF NAGPUR v. RAMACHANDRA G. MODAK (AIR 1984 SCC 626) to contend that the acquittal by the Criminal Court by itself would not take away the power of the authority to continue the departmental enquiry its discretion in that regard remains unfettered and therefore submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in SULEKH CHAND v. COMMISISONER OF POLICE (1994) 28 Administrative Tribunals Cases 711 and contended that once there is an order of acquittal on merits, there is no scope at all to proceed with the departmental enquiry. In that judgment, the Supreme Court of India had stated the principle as hereunder: "It is settled law that though the delinquent official may get an acquittal on technical grounds, the authorities are entitled to conduct departmental enquiry on the selfsame allegations and take appropriate disciplinary action. But, here, as stated earlier, the acquittal was on merits." Learned counsel for the first respondent also relied upon another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in M.PAUL ANTHONY v. BHARAT GOLD MINES LIMITED (1999 SUPEREME COURT 1416) to reiterate the same principle. In answer to this, the learned Special Government Pleader would argue that the Special Court in this case did not give a honourable acquittal but it is only due to the benefit of doubt arising on the facts available in this case. THErefore such a judgment based on the benefit of doubt alone would amount to acquittal on technical grounds, which will not bar the department to proceed with the enquiry.