P G NARAYANAN Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A license is applied for and is under the process of being considered. The writ petitioner files what is said to be a'public interest Litigation'and prays for a mandamus to reject the application. The question boils down to whether such a prayer can be granted.

(2.) MR. N. Jothi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the application of the sixth respondent for the grant of Direct To Home (DTH) License should be rejected since it would violate articles 38 and 39-C of the Constitution of India, and since the rule of law is not being followed in the processing of the said application, and in view of the presence of the Union Minister for Communications and Information Technology, who is the brother of MR. Kalanidhi Maran, who is at the helm of the SUN TV network of Companies, there is every chance of there being undue influence in the processing of the application, the entire process is vitiated by mala fides and bias and since there is imminent danger of the application being considered favourably violating the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002, the petitioner is entitled to maintain a quia timet action. Learned counsel further submitted that though specific allegations have been made naming the Union minister and his brother MR. Kalanidhi Maran in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, neither of them has chosen to deny the allegations and therefore, the allegations stand unrebutted. The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner, being a Member of Parliament who has already filed a public Interest Litigation, which is pending, has the locus standi to bring to the notice of the Court when glaring violations of law are being perpetrated and he is also entitled to maintain this Public Interest Litigation. The learned counsel further submitted that though a letter has been given to the respondents to produce the relevant files, they had not produced them, which itself shows that not all is well. The learned counsel also submitted that even if the prayer in the writ petition is framed properly that can not prevent this court from granting the relief sought for, since the majesty of law must be upheld. Learned counsel relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions: Nomenclature under which writ petition is filed is not relevant'Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, 1988 (5)S. C. C. 749. Neither the Supreme Court nor the High Court should dismiss a writ petition on a mere technicality or just because the proper relief is not asked for; the Courts have the power to mould the relief so as to meet the requirement of the case'Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1984 (4) S. C. C. 251. Locus standi.'Chairman, Railway Board v. MRs. Chandrima Das, 2000 (2) S. C. C. 465. Scope and ambit of Public Interest Litigation.' guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C. K. Rajan, 2003 (7) SCC 546; State of West Bengal v. Ashutosh Lahiri, 1995 (1) SCC 189; Indian Banks'Association v. Devkala Consultancy Service, 2004 (11) SCC 1; and Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of Kalyan & Dombivali, 2004 (11) SCC 417. Bias.'Metropolitan Properties Co. (F. G. C.) Ltd. v. Lannon, 1968 (3) All E. R. 304; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386; Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. J. Jayalalitha, 1994 WLR 59; J. Jayalalitha v. T. N. Seshan, Chief Election Commissioner, 1993 WLR 34; J. Mohaparta & Co. v. State of Orissa, 1984 (4) SCC 103; K. Chelliah v. Chairman, Industrial financial Corporation of India, AIR 1973 Mad. 122; A. K. Kraipak v. Union of india, AIR 1970 SC 150 and Dr. G. Sarana v. Lucknow University, AIR 1976 SC 2428. Mala fides.'Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh madhav Gosavi, 1987 (1) SCC 227. Effect of non-denial - C. S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh , air 1964 SC 962. Non-production of records.'R. K. Jain v. Union of india, 1993 (4) SCC 119 and State of Kerala v. V. Narayana Pillai, 2000 (10) SCC 265.

(3.) IN Chairman, Railway Board v. Mrs. Chandrima Das, 2000 (2) SCC 465, a Public INterest Litigation filed by an Advocate was entertained because the Supreme Court was satisfied that what was violated was the right of a woman to live with human dignity and it was held that the primacy of the interest of the nation and security of the State will have to be read into the universal Declaration as also Article 21 of the Constitution. Similarly, in state of West Bengal v. Ashutosh Lahiri, 1995 (1) SCC 189, the Supreme Court held that no fault could be found with the decision of the High Court recognizing the locus standi of the writ petitioners as representing the Hindu segment of the society which felt aggrieved by the impugned exemption granted by the State exempting the operation of the West Bengal Animal Slaughter control Act, 1950 on Bakrid Day. Similarly, in INdian Banks'Association v. Devkala Consultancy Service, 2004 (11) SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that the rule of locus standi has been relaxed by the Courts to vindicate a legal injury or a legal wrong caused to a section of the people by grave violation of any statutory and constitutional provisions. At the same time, the Supreme court has also taken note of the fact that Public INterest Litigations have been misused. The following extracts from Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West bengal, 2004 (3) SCC 349, are relevant :' 'court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests - (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. IN such case, however, the court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphe re reserved by the Constitution to the executive and the legislature. It is depressing to note that on account of trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of genuine litigants. Though the Supreme Court spares no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending its long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, unrepresented and unheard; yet it could not avoid but express its opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death and facing the gallows under untold agony, persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters -government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenus expecting their release from detention orders, etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for the glare of publicity break the queue muffling their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of genuine litigants and resultantly, they lose faith in the administration of our judicial system. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate case, with exemplary costs. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with a large number of so-called public interest litigations where even a miniscule percentage can legitimately be called public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr.) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra , 1998 (7) SCC 273, this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could to is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. IN one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the courts should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as aforestated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.'