SATHYANATHAN Vs. DEPUTY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records of the fourth respondent pertaining to the Order made in O. A. No. 2969 of 2003 dated 13. 3. 2004 and quash the same and consequently direct the respondents 1 to 3 to alter the date of birth of the petitioner from 21. 5. 1948 to 26. 6. 1951 in his service records with all consequential benefits.

(2.) THE petitioner is now working as Under- Secretary to the Government attached to E and F Department, Secretariat, Chennai. It is per­tinent to refer the proceedings initiated by the petitioner before the tribunal in O. A. No. 4225 of 2002 prior to the filing of O. A. No. 2969 of 2003. On 12. 7. 2002, the Tribunal had issued necessary directions to the Commissioner of revenue, Administration, Chepauk, Chennai­ 5, to send their report to the government within a period of six months. THE Secretary to the Government, personnel and Administrative Reforms (Q) Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9, on receipt of the report from the Special Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue administration, Chennai, rejected the request of the petitioner for altering the date of birth from 21. 5. 1948 to 26. 6. 1951. Aggrieved over the rejection order passed by the Secretary to the Government, Personnel and Administrative reforms (Q) Department, Secretariat, Chennai-9, the petitioner had approached the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal by filing O. A. No. 2969 of 2003, seeking necessary relief and the same was dismissed on 12. 7. 2002. Aggrieved by the said order passed by the Tribunal, the petitioner had preferred this writ petition invoking Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for the relief stated supra.

(3.) IT is further stated that such being the case, petitioner cannot claim to enjoy another'to be in service for another three years there is no clinching evidence. In the learned senior counsel would that, when considering the claim of the petitioner, the third respondent simply followed the report of the second respondent. Inspire of the production of sufficient documents furnished by the petitioner for altering the date of birth from 21. 5. 1948 to 26. 6. 1951, the Tri­bunal had not appreciated those relevant materials and simply followed the decision of the third respondent. In such circumstances, the order passed by the Tribunal is not at all sustainable in law and is liable only to be set aside.