MANI Vs. RENT CONTROLLER PRINCIPAL DISTRICT MUNSIF TINDIVANAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this writ petition, the petitioner who is the tenant of the premises bearing No. 243, Jawarlal Nehru Street, Tindivanam has challenged the order dated 14-6-1978 made in M.C.O.P. No. 7 of 1977 and as also the order dated 5-12-1984 in E.P. No. 186 of 1984 on the file of the Rent Controller, Tindivanam, first respondent herein. Second respondent is the landlord.

(2.) IT is the case of the petitioner that in the petition for eviction filed by the landlord, the second respondent, a compromise decree was made on 14-6-1988 in R.C.O.P. No. 7 of 1977. In the decree that was made on a momo of compromise by the parties, it was stated inter alia that in as per the reasons set forth in the memo of compromise, eviction can be ordered. There is no dispute about the fact that in the petition for eviction filed, reasons for eviction was set out, the reason being bona fide requirement of the premises for the running of the business by the second respondent's son. Four years time was given to vacate the premises and for handing over vacant possession. The tenant having not vacated the premises, the landlord had filed an execution petition and delivery was ordered by the executing court on 5-12-1984. IT must be noted here that the tenant had not raised in the execution proceedings, the objection now put forth that the decree is a nullity. The Executing Court had no occasion to consider the plea, now raised by the petitioner.

(3.) THE argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that not withstanding the compromise memo, the decree passed is a nullity as the Court, according to the learned counsel, has failed to apply its mind and the decree could not be made on the mere consent. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in Srimathi Kaushalya Devi and others. v. K.L. Bansal (1969(1) S.C.C. 59) and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Manmal and another (1970(3) S.C.C. 181), wherein the Court considered the provisions of the Ajmir Act and held that mere consent cannot form the basis for attributing satisfaction to the Court of the grounds for eviction under the provisions of the Rent Control Act.