SAKTHI ALIAS SAKTHIVEL Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE present action had been initiated by the detenu sakthi alias Sakthivel, under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India praying for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, directing the respondents to produce him before this Court and set him at liberty forthwith.

(2.) THE District Magistrate and Collector of Chidambaranar district, Tuticorin, second respondent in exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 clamped upon the detenu the impugned order of detention in his proceedings H. S. (M)Confdl. No. 15/94 dated 19. 3. 1994 with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and health.

(3.) BEFORE entering into a discussion as to whether the facts and circumstances of the ground case constitutes a public disorder or a mere law and order situation, better it is, we think to understand those two concepts, in a better fashion and such a feat can be performed by citing a decision in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, A. I. R. 1982 S. C. 1143, emerging from the Apex Court of this country. Their Lordships of the supreme Court settled a nice distinction between'public order' and'law and order'in a scintillating fashion and what their lordships said about those concepts, if penned down here, would be of immense help in deciding the question as now posed in this case with ease and grace and without any difficulty whatever. It is reflected thus: '13. The true distinction between the areas of 'public order'and'law and order'lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of Maw and order'and 'public order'is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. That test is clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case.' 17. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular act of violence creating disorder that distinguishes it as an act affecting public order from that concerning law and order. Some offences primarily injure specific and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. The question is of the survival of the society and the problem is the method of control. Whenever there is an armed hold-up by gangsters in an exclusive residential area persons are deprived of watch or cash, or ladies relieved of their gold-chains or ornaments at the point of a knife or revolver, they become victims of organised crime. There is very little that the police can do about it except to keep a constant vigil over the movements of such persons. The particular acts enumerated in the grounds of detention clearly show that the activities of the detenu cover a wide field and fail within the contours of the concept of public order.'