(1.) HAVING regard to similar facts and common questions of law that arise for consideration in these writ petitions, they were heard together and they are disposed of conveniently by this common order.
(2.) IN short the facts leading to these writ petitions are: The first respondent called for application for grant of right to quarry in respect of certain quarry under Rule8 (1) (a) of The Tamil Nadu Mineral concession Rules, 1959, (for short'the Rules') in the District gazette, Salem, the petitioners being repatriates, entitled for preference in the right of quarry, applied for the quarries in Survey No. 492 of an extent of 1. 10. 0 hectares at Kannamoochi Village, Mettur Taluk, Salem District, in Survey no. 6 to an extent of 5. 00. 0 hectares at Anaikattipalayam Village, Rasipuram taluk, Salem District respectively. The first respondent after following the rules and regulations, granted lease in favour of the petitioners for the periodfroml4. 7. 1992to31. 12. 1994and entered into lease agreement dated 14. 7. 1992 after making an inspection and after satisfying the requirements. The petitioners were put in possession of the respective lands and they started quarrying. As per the termsandconditionsofleaseagreement,theyshould be allowed to enjoy the quarrying to extract the minerals in the land and transport the same to any place of business of their choice. While quarrying operations were carried on, the petitioners found the availability of rough stones in big sizes (in blocks ). Hence, they applied to the first respondent, seeking permission to quarry rough stones in blocks and remove the said blocks. The first respondent did not reply to the applications made by the petitioners either rejecting or allowing to quarry the stones in blocks and to remove the same. INspite of repeated requests, no permission was granted by the authorities. Under the circumstances, these writ petitions are filed for issue of writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to forbear from interfering with petitioners right to quarry and remove the rough stones in blocks from the respective survey numbers, in respect of which, lease agreements are executed, contending that in the terms and conditions of the lease agreement, there is no prohibition to quarry rough stone in blocks. As per the terms and conditions of lease and in the absence of prohibition to quarry rough stones in blocks, the petitioners cannot be prohibited from quarrying the rough stones in blocks and in removing or transporting the same. According to the petitioners, in similar situation, the Division Bench of this Court in N. Ganapathy v. The Collector of Chingleput at Kanchipuram, W. A. No. 988 of 1988 had taken the view that the State Government having not choosen to impose certain conditions, the Collector had no jurisdiction to either introduce or insist on such conditions. Similarly, in genghadaran v. The Collector of North Arcot Ambedkar District at Vellore and another, W. A. No. 690 of 1990, the Division Bench of this Court has held that no new conditions can be imposed apart from what had already been imposed in lease agreement. It is further submitted that in W. M. P. No. 4977 of 1992 in W. P. No. 3542 of 1992 and in W. M. P. No. 10768 of l 992 in W. P. No. 7464 of 1992, this Court granted order of injunction and that the petitioners are similarly placed. It is the further case of the petitioners that this Court in W. P. 14879 of 1992 has held that when there is no condition in the lease agreement, prohibiting the petitioner to quarryroughstoneinblocks,the respondents should not interfere with the petitioner's right to quarry, remove and transport the rough stone in blocks. IN the lease agreement of the petitioners there is no condition restricting the size of stone and as such the petitioners are entitled to quarry rough stone in blocks and transport the same to the place of business of their choice, subject to their paying necessary seigniorage fee. On these grounds, the petitioners have sought for the reliefs in these writ petitions. The petitioners sought for amendment of prayer in the writ petitions in W. M. P. Nos. 17934 and 17935 of 1994. The said W. M. Ps. were allowed as the prayer made in the amendment applications were only consequential and based on the facts already pleaded. Further the amendment applications were also not opposed.
(3.) BOTH the learned counsel have placed reliance on ten decisions in support of their contentions and their point of view. I will refer to and consider them hereinafter.