P N VALLARASU Vs. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These three petitions have been referred to the Division Bench by Natarajan J., because according to the learned Judge, the matters raised in these petitions by the petitioner appear to him to be res integra. The additional ground stated by the learned Judge for referring the matter to the Division Bench was that the special circumstances of the case warrant the writ petitions being heard and disposed of within two weeks.

(2.) The facts have been sufficiently set out in the referring order of the learned Judge. But we may briefly state that the substantial grievance of the petitioner in the above petitions is that, what is described by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the course of the arguments as R.2(d) relating to the officers before whom the candidate may make or subscribe oath of affirmation is ultra vires of the Constitution. It is obvious that if the petitioner is right in his contentions, then he was entitled to canvass the further contention that the nomination paper of Thiru M.G. Ramachandran, the fourth respondent in the petitions, was liable to be rejected, because he vas not qualified to contest in the forthcoming election to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly by reason of his failure to make and subscribe an oath or affirmation in conformity with Art.173(a) of the Constitution of India. In the three petitions W.P. 12152, 12153 and 12154 of 1984 respectively, the relief asked for is a declaration that (1) R.2(d) made by the Election Commission is void; (2) Thiru M.G. Ramachandran is not qualified to contest the election and (3) the authorisation of the Consul General in New York by the first respondent-Election Commission authorising the said Consul-General as the person before whom an oath for the purpose of Art.173(a) of the Constitution may be taken by the fourth respondent, was ultra vires of the Constitution and void.

(3.) In his usual persuasive manner Mr. Ramaswami has concentrated on what he contended as the constitutional aspect of the validity of R.2(d), and he made it clear that the petitioner was not interested in having the election stayed, and if the petitions are admitted, they could be heard along with the Election Petition that may ultimately be filed. With his characteristic fairness, he stated before us that if this would have been a matter in which the acceptance of the nomination paper was alone challenged, the petitioner would be faced with a bar under Art.329(b) of the Constitution, but according to the learned counsel, the petitioner was more concerned with the validity of what he described as R.2(d).