MUTHUSWAMI PILLAI Vs. INSPECTOR OF POLICE, ILAYANGUDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition by the accused for quashing the proceedings initiated against them by the Respondent -complainant. On 19th October 1973, one Sundarapandian Pillai was injured at 12 noon. He reported it to the police. The matter was investigated. The case was referred as false. Then he filed a complaint against (sic) Petitioners for offences under Ss. 323 and 324 I.P.C., Process was issued in C.C. No. 50 of 1974 by the Second Class Magistrate, Paramakudi. That case ended in an acquittal. Subsequent to this acquittal, the Inspector of Police, suo motu took up the matter and filed the charge sheet against these Petitioners for an offence under Sec. 326, I.P.C. This case is numbered as C.C. No. 116 of 1974 and the same is pending in the court of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ramanatbapuram. The Petitioners contended that the present complaint is barred under Sec. 403 Code of Criminal Procedure. This contention did not find favour with the learned Magistrate. He held that the offence now charged is a different one within the meaning of Clause (f) of Sec. 403. With this finding, he dismissed the petition filed by the Petitioners for dropping further proceedings. The Petitioners have now filed this petition for quashing the proceedings.

(2.) The previous complaint was for an offence under Sec. 324 I.P.C., Four witnesses were examined in that case. P.W. 1 deposed that on 19th October 1973 at 12 noon, Petitioner No. 1 beat him with an iron door patta in the head, while A -2 beat him with a manvatti kanai on the head. P.Ws. 2 and 3 witnessed this assault. Ex. P -1 complaint was given at the station by P.W. 1. This complaint was referred after investigation by the police as false. Ex. P -3 referred notice was served. Thereupon, P.W. 1 preferred a complaint in court and deposed to the circumstances under which be sustained the injuries. P.Ws. 2 and 5 were put into the box by him for corroborating this version. Since there was material for framing the charge, the learned Magistrate framed a charge against the Petitioners for an offence under Sec. 324, I.P.C. The defence was one of denial. Disbelieving the evidence given by P.Ws. 1 to 3, the learned Magistrate finally acquitted the Petitioners. P.W. 3's name did not find any place in the report, Ex P -1. Alagarswamy Thevar, Parvathi Ammal and Karuppayee, persons mentioned as eye witnesses in the report were not examined. Observing that the evidence adduced on the side of the prosecution through P.Ws. 1 to 3 was full of discrepancy and stating that their conduct in not intervening or raising any alarm was not the conduct of persons who witness an occurrence, the learned Magistrate disbelieved them in tow and acquitted the Petitioners. Thus, this is a case where the leaned Magistrate has actually disbelieved the evidence given by the injured and the eye witnesses and acquitted the Petitioners. In such circumstances, the rule of issue estoppel would apply. In other words, where an issue of fact has been tried by a competent court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of an accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different or distinct offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of Sec. 403(2). The rule is not the same as the plea of double jeopardy or autre fois acquit. The rule does not introduce any variation in the Code of Criminal Procedure, either in investigation, enquiry, or trial, nor does it prevent the trial offence as does autre fois acquit, but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issues as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a court of competent jurisdiction. In other words, the rules thus relate only to the admissibility of evidence which is designed to upset a finding of fact recorded by a competent court at a previous trial - -vide Manipur Administration v/s. Thokchom Bira Singh : A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 87 and also Krishnan v/s. Muthuswami Udayar, (1971) L.W. (Cri.) 233.

(3.) Thus, in this view, the prosecution is not entitled to adduce any evidence so as to upset the finding of fact already arrived at by a competent court. In this view of the matter, the present prosecution is not sustainable and the proceedings are liable to be quashed. The proceedings in C.C. No. 116 of 1974 are quashed. The revision is allowed.