SETH KUSHIRAM BEHARILAL REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER SRI TIRATHDAS AND ANR. Vs. THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENT AND ORS.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only point raised in these two appeals is that, after the expiry of Madras Act XVIII of 1970, the notices issued under Section 18 of the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1959 on 14th October, 1970 and on 15th October, 1970 demanding, or proposing to assess, tax by way of cess thereunder were without jurisdiction. This Court struck down the validity of Section 18 of the parent Act, in so far as it related to charge of sales tax by way of cess on declared goods. Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of 1970 followed and they were replaced by Madras Acts XVIII and XIX of 1970. Those Acts were enacted and published on 29th September, 1970. Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of Act XVIII of 1970 is rather unusual inasmuch as it says that Section 2 shall be deemed to have come into force on 22nd October, 1962 and shall remain in force till such date as the State Government may, by notification, appoint. The purpose of the Act appears to be to recast Section 18 as it stood before the amendment in order to remove the constitutional objections thereto. So, the amendment was to this effect. For the words, " The market committee shall levy a cess by way of sales tax on any notified agricultural produce bought or sold" the words "the market committee shall, in the case of notified agricultural produces (other than notified agricultural produces which are declared goods) levy a cess by way of sales tax on such notified agricultural produces bought or sold " shall be substituted. The rest of the amended provisions need not be set out for present purposes. Consistent with this amendment, Section 3 provides for validation and it is in the usual form. We extract below this section:

(2.) The argument before us is that Madras Act XVIII of 1970 like the Ordinances, which led to it, being a temporary statute in the sense that it was to have force only upto the date fixed by the Government, the principles applicable to temporary or expiring statutes should be extended to the instant cases so that prohibition may issue against further proceedings pursuant to the notices. It is perfectly true that any act done or omitted to be done by way of offences, or which gives rise to a liability, cannot be proceeded with, or original action be initiated after the expiry of such a statute. This is particularly so in the case of temporary Acts which created offences. This principle has been extended also to the field of taxation. Craies on Statute Law in the Seventh Edition puts it thus:

(3.) In the construction of amending statutes which are claimed to be temporary, the object of the amendment and the legislative purpose in the context of the facts preceding will have to be borne in mind. De hors the context, not unoften, the amending text read by itself is likely to lead to misleading results. The governing purpose of the Amending Act XVIII of 1970, like the related Ordinances being to validate assessments made under the section as it stood originally, and to remove the objections pointed out by this Court to the validity of the section, the amendment was introduced. That being the limited purpose of the amendment, we do not regard the charge itself made by Section 18 as it originally stood as having been rendered a temporary or expiring statutory provision by means of Madras Act XVIII of 1970. To read so would, in our opinion, be to miss the whole purpose and the objective of the amendment. Section 18 as it originally stood Was not a temporary one. Any liability, therefore, which was incurred under it could be pursued and the tax could be charged, assessed, quantified and collected.