(1.) THE suit property which is situated within the City of Madras originally belonged to one Murugesa Mudaliar. By a settlement deed dated 17 -4 -1941 he gave a life interest in it in favour of his wife Gnanambal and after her death to his daughter Kamalammal for life with the vested remainder in favour of sons of Kamalammal. Both the life interest holders Gnanambal and Kamalammal were prohibited from alienating the property or in any way encumbering the same except under certain circumstances which have not arisen in this case. Gnanambal the first life estate holder leased the suit site in favour of the defendant -respondent herein sometime in the year 1950. There is a dispute' as to the exact extent of the land leased but that is not material for the purpose of disposal of this case. After obtaining the lease the tenant had put up a superstructure thereon and had been in possession and enjoyment of the same. Gnanambal filed an ejectment suit No. 246 of 1962 on the file of the Court of Small Causes, Madras, against the tenant. It appears that the tenant claimed his right under Section 9 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1921 (Act 3 of 1922) (hereinafter called the Act) for purchasing the site on which he had constructed the superstructure. Pending this suit, Gnanambal died on 26 -9 -1963. Kamalammal was brought on record as legal representative of Gnanambal but she did not proceed with the suit and withdrew the same with liberty to file a fresh suit. Thereafter she filed an ejectment suit No. 8012/67 against the respondent herein end that suit was dismissed for lack of notice terminating the tenancy. In the meanwhile subsequent to the death of Gnanambal the respondent was paying the rent in respect of the suit site to Kamalammal. The present suit was filed by Kamalammal after notice terminating the tenancy for ejectment.
(2.) IN this suit the Defendant -Respondent filed M. P. 1855 of 1968 under Section 9 of the Act praying for a direction to Kamalammal to sell the suit site to him. The present petition arises from this suit. It was the case of the plaintiff -petitioner herein that the tenancy created by Gnanambal came to an end with her death on 26 -9 -1963 that subsequent to her death at the request of the respondent she agreed and entered into a fresh agreement of tenancy on a monthly rent of Rs. 10/ - and since the tenancy was subsequent to 1955 the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the same. It was the case of the Respondent that he was a tenant under Gnanambal, that after her death he was paying the rent to Kamalammal, the petitioner herein but there was no fresh tenancy agreement between the petitioner and the respondent. It was contended by him that he continued to be a tenant under the original tenancy agreement entered into by him with Gnanambal in the year 1950 and that therefore he is entitled to the protection under the Act and has a right of purchase under Section 9 of the Act. The trial Court decreed the suit. But the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit holding that the respondent is entitled to claim a right of purchase under Section 9, of the Act. Hence the plaintiff has filed the present revision petition.
(3.) BEFORE discussing the reasoning of the learned Judges, I would like to consider the issues with reference to the provisions of the Act and the relevant decided cases. As the relevant provisions of the Act have been quoted in extenso in the judgments of the learned Judges, I refrain from quoting the same. The Act is applicable in respect of tenancies created prior to 12 -9 -1955. According to the petitioner though the tenancy under Gnanambal was in the year 1950 since she had only interest in the suit site that tenancy came to an end on her death in 1963. The petitioner was not claiming any right, title or interest in the suit property under Gnanambal and her life estate is derived by her directly under the deed executed by her father and that therefore the tenancy, agreement with Gnanambal was neither valid nor could be enforced as against the petitioner. Even if the express agreement of tenancy with the petitioner subsequent to the death of Gnanambal as pleaded by her had not been established the payment of rent by the respondent and acceptance of the same by the petitioner subsequent to the death of Gnanambal amounted to a fresh tenancy and not a continuation of the earlier tenancy created by Gnanambal and that therefore the Act was not applicable. Alternatively, it was contained on behalf of the petitioner that since the tenancy under Gnanambal shall be deemed to have come to an end on her death in 1963 thereafter there was no landlord end tenant relationship which would make the respondent a tenant within the meaning of the Act. Further Gnanambal and even the petitioner were only having life interest in the suit site and if it is to be held that there was a tenancy agreement they could be directed to sell under Section 9 only their life interest and not the full ownership in the lands which they did not possess and that the tenant who purchased the same could only get ownership in the land terminable on the death of the life estate holder.