ARUMUGHA GOUNDER Vs. ARDHANARI MUDALIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference raises an interesting question as to whether a tenant let into possession of land and incidental immovable property by a Receiver appointed by Court pending a suit would, be entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. The suit was brought by the tenant for an injunction, out of which the second appeal arises. The lease in his favour was in 1957 and it was to enure after renewal every year upto November 15, 1961. In that year, the Receiver was discharged, but the tenant continued to hold over and cultivate the land. When the true owner sought possession, the plaintiff brought the suit for a preventitive injunction from disturbance. His, ground was that he having been let into possession by the Receiver as a tenant, after expiry of the term of the lease he continued to be in possession and cultivated the land, and that as such he would be a cultivating tenant by operation of law and entitled to protection from dispossession under the Act.

(2.) FOR the appellant strong reliance was placed on Serang Abdul Khadir v. Rajagopala Pandrayar, (1956) 1 Mad LJ 34 which was concerned with a tenant under the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act. The lands in that case belonged to a Devasthanam. A Receiver was appointed by Court under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure who granted a lease in favour of two persons for a certain period. The Devasthanam took possession of the lands on the expiry of the lease granted by the Receiver and cultivated the land itself. Respondents 1 to 8 before the Court were sub -lessees from the original lessees. For the year 1952 -53, the Devasthanam, leased out the lands to the appellant there. . The question before the Court was who was entitled to the benefits of the Act. Whether it was the appellant or respondents 1 to 8. Those respondents filed an application under Section 6 (2) of the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act successfully and possession was restored to them. An appeal arising out of it failed, and, thereafter, a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution came before Rajagopalan, J. The prayer there was for a right to have the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer quashed on the ground that the respondents would not be entitled to the rights conferred by the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the Act. The appellant in the appeal denied that the respondents would be entitled to any such right because of two reasons. One was that they were sub -lessees under a lease from a Receiver, and a Receiver could not be deemed to be a "land owner" within the meaning of the definition of that term in Section 2 (g) of the Act. The other reason was that respondents 1 to 8 were not "cultivating tenants" within the meaning of the term in Section 2 (g) because they were not in possession under a tenancy agreement with the land owner, to wit, the Devasthanam, and their only agreement, was with the lessees. Rajagopalan, J. overruled those objections. The same two grounds were reiterated before the then learned Chief Justice and Panchapakesa Aiyer, J., but not without success. They were of opinion that a Receiver virtually represented the real owner of the property in his possession, and that he would, therefore, be the owner for the time being of the property and would fall within the definition of "land owner" in Section 2 (g) of the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act, 1952. They referred to the definition of the words "cultivating tenant" in Section 2 (d) of the Act and to the fact that a tenancy agreement, express or implied, did not indicate that such agreement must be with the land owner as defined in Section 2 (g) as persons who contributed their own physical labour or that of the members of their family in the cultivation of land belonging to another and who were so cultivating under a tenancy agreement, that is to say, not as trespassers or as owners, would be within the definition of the term "cultivating tenant". Ramaswamy Gounder v. Kalliappa Gounder, (1964) 1 Mad LJ 368 decided by Ramachandra Iyer, C. J., was directly under the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. That was a case of a lease of agricultural land for one year from property guardian of minor under the directions of Court. The learned Chief Justice was of opinion that the lessee was not entitled to protection under the Act. He distinguished (1956) 1 Mad LJ 34 : (ILR (1956) Mad 830) on the ground that the Bench decision related to the Tanjore Pannaiyal Protection Act which had a different scheme from that of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. He pointed out that a lessee from a Receiver who was authorised to lease the property for a limited period during the pendency of certain proceedings or from a guardian during the period of his guardianship subject to the directions of the Court, could not obtain the benefits of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, unless the Court by appropriate directions conferred by its order such benefit at the time of granting the lease. It was further held that the lessee would have no right to continue in possession of the land beyond the period of the lease.

(3.) BUT on a deeper consideration of the matter, we are of opinion that such literal extension of the provisions of the Act to the case of a tenant let into possession by a Receiver would not only be opposed to public policy but also be unjust so far as the litigants in the litigation are concerned. Take for instance the case of a plaintiff who claims to recover possession on the basis of title vested in him and the suit being resisted by a denial of the claim and the defendant also being in possession who, pending the litigation having been appointed as Receiver, lets out to a tenant who after the plaintiff sets a decree, claims protection under the Act. It will, at once, be obvious that by the act of the Receiver letting the tenant into possession it has been placed beyond the reach of the Court to give the plaintiff the remedy he sought for which the Court held he would be entitled to. In our opinion, the intention of the Act is not to cover such a case. The preamble to the Act says that it is one for the protection from eviction of cultivating tenants in certain areas in the State of Madras, because it is necessary to protect such tenants in those areas from unjust eviction. The legal position of a Receiver is not open to doubt. Under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Court has power, when it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, to appoint a Receiver of any property whether before or after decree. Under that order, the Court has power to remove any person from the possession or custody of the property and commit the same to the possession, custody, or management of the Receiver. The Court may confer upon the Receiver all such powers, as to bringing and defending suits, management, protection, preservation and improvement of the property, the collection of the rents and profits thereof, the application and disposal of such rents and profits and the execution of the documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. The duties of a Receiver are also listed in Rule 3 of the Order. It seems to be clear from this order that, when the Court appoints a Receiver to take possession of immovable property involved in a suit, the effect is that the Court takes the property into its own custody and the Receiver is inducted by the Court by the appointment to act as agent of the Court. In order to enable the Receiver to manage the property, incidentally powers are conferred upon him. We are unable to consider the Receiver as owner of the property, only by reason of his appointment as Receiver to take possession and manage the property. He may have powers of management as in the case of an owner of property. But it is not the same as ownership. On account of his possession as Receiver he cannot, claim that he is the owner. He acts on orders of Court and his acts are subject to the directions of Court. In the instance we gave, if the tenant of the Receiver is held to be entitled to statutory protection from eviction, it would in effect defeat the ends of justice and incapacitate the Court from giving relief to the one who is entitled to it according to the decree of the Court. The acts of a Receiver are, therefore, not intended to bring about such a result.