MANAGEMENT OF JAWAHAR MILLS Vs. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) ON a reference under S. 10 (1) (c) of the question "whether deduction of two days' wages and dearness allowance from the earnings of the workers concerned for the month of March 1961, was justified?" the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, answered it in the negative. The employer is Jawahar Mills Ltd. , Salem, a textile industry and, therefore, a public utility service within the meaning of S. 22 of the industrial disputes Act. The workmen would appear to have opposed the introduction by the Management of two additional cone winding machines in the reeling department, which eventually resulted in a strike on December 9, 10, 14 to 16, 1960. The dispute regarding the introduction of winding machines was settled on 19-12-1960. In January 1961, the management issued notices calling upon the workmen to show cause why action should not be taken against them for resorting to an illegal strike. The management was not satisfied with the explanation and on the view that the strike was not justified passed an order on 15-3-1961, cutting the wages of the workmen for two days. This they purported to do under the proviso to S. 9 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. In addition, the management had also made a deduction earlier of five day's wages, but this deduction is not in dispute. The workmen protested against the additional deduction under the said proviso, which led to the industrial dispute. The Tribunal noticed that it had been admitted that the strike was illegal in the sense that no notice had been given. Nevertheless in the Tribunal's view of the circumstances, the workmen were not blame for resorting to a strike, and it was unable to see on what ground it could be stated that the strike was without reasonable cause. On that basis, the tribunal held that the deduction under the proviso was not justified. This petition is to quash the Tribunal's award.

(2.) THE argument for the petitioner is that the tribunal has misinterpreted the proviso to S. 9 of the Payment of Wages Act. Learned Counsel contends that once the strike was admitted to be illegal with reference to S. 22 of the Industrial disputes Act, it could not be justified by any reasonable cause. In order to appreciate this argument, it is necessary to notice the exact terms of the proviso. Section 9 (1) allows deduction by the Management of wages for absence from duty. Sub-section (2) places a limit upon the deduction. Both the first two sub-sections apply to individual workmen. The proviso, which I will presently read, covers actions in concert and consequent absence of more workers than one without due notice and without reasonable cause. In such a case, the proviso permits a further deduction which may include such amount not exceeding the workman's wages for 8 days. The proviso is:

(3.) THE argument for the respondent is based upon Ss. 31 and 33-A. Section 33 enjoins that without the permission of the prescribed authority, no management, during the pendency of a conciliation proceeding or any proceeding before the authorities mentioned, can, it regard to the matters mentioned dispense with the services of a workman except with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. A contravention of this provision is made punishable by S. 31. Section 33-A makes special provision for adjudication as to whether the conditions of service were changed during the pendency of any such proceeding. The Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. All India punjab National Bank Employees Federation, held that in an application under that section the fact that no permission was obtained from the prescribed authority would not be conclusive, but the Tribunal, should have to go into the further question whether there was proper cause for the employer to change the conditions of service of the workmen concerned. Mr. Lakshminarayana reddi, for one f the respondents, argues that through a contravention of S. 33 is made a penal offence by S. 31, nevertheless, in an enquiry under S. 33-A the tribunal is obliged to go into the question not only of want of permission, but also the question whether there was a proper cause for termination. Learned counsel applies this analogy to the interpretation of the proviso to S. 9 and he says that notwithstanding the fact that a strike may be illegal, the question whether it was for a reasonable cause could be gone into by the Tribunal. In my view, this contention cannot be accepted, The Tribunal, under S. 33-A is directed to deal with the application as an industrial dispute and is authorised, as has been held by the Supreme Court, to go into the question of not only want of permission, but if the was want of permission, also into the question whether there was sufficient case for the management to change the conditions of service. I do not think that the analogy of S. 33-A read with the other two sections can be applied to the interpretation of the proviso. In my view once it is held that the strike was illegal, and here the fact was admitted, it cannot be justified by a reasonable cause for committing an illegality and that being the case, of an illegal strike, in a public utility service, the question of reasonable cause will not arise.