(1.) THIS appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent herein for recovery of vacant possession of the suit property from the possession of the appellant herein, who is a tenant in respect of premises No. 20, Kasi Chetty Street, George Town, Madras, on a rent of Rs. 550 per month. The appellant is occupying the entire premises of the aforesaid suit property except for three shops on the front side in the ground floor and two rooms and one bathroom on the northern side in the first floor. The respondent -landlord terminated the tenancy by giving a notice, dated 10th October, 1960, to the appellant -tenant, and called upon him to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises by the end of October, 1960. The appellant, however, failed and neglected to comply with the demand. Thereupon, the landlord filed the suit aforesaid in the City Civil Court, Madras (O.S. No. 2915 of 1960) for recovery of vacant possession of the suit property from the appellant -tenant. The suit was resisted by the appellant herein stating that he has been in occupation of the house both for residential and non -residential purposes, that the building has not been exempted from the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, and that, in any event, the exemption provided in the Act offends Article 14 of the Constitution, which provides for equality before law and that therefore he was not liable to be evicted. The learned Fifth Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court found that the building in question was substantially residential in character, that the suit building was exempted from the provisions of the Act, and that the provision exempting the building from the purview of the Act did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. In the result he decreed the suit and ordered eviction. It is against this decree, that the tenant has preferred this appeal.
(2.) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has seriously contended that the building is not purely residential in character but residential and non -residential and there -fore the finding arrived at by the lower Court cannot be supported. He also con -tended that Section 30 of the Rent Control Act offended the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution.
(3.) NOW , the main question for consideration is whether this provision in the Act really violates Article 14 of the Constitution, thereby infringing the clause relating to equality before law. It is now well -established that, while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In the words of the Supreme Court: