RAJAGOPAL Vs. STATE OF PONDICHERRY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition that seeks for review by way of Causation, the judgment of the Tribunal Superior d' Appeal at Pondicherry which in turn confirmed the judgment of the Tribunal de Premiere Instance de Karikal, under which the first accused, the petitioner herein, a driver, was convicted and directed to pay a fine of Rs. 20 for causing obstructions to the officers of the Customs Department, involving a contravention of S. 167 (78) of the Sea Customs Act, which reads:

(2.) THE first point arises out of proved facts themselves. The proved facts are that, when the first accused was driving a car, the customs officers, suspecting that the car contained contraband, directed the car to stop. The first accused stopped the car momentarily and then shortly afterwards accelerated and drove away. Now, the section of the Sea Customs Act which has been already extracted, deals with intentional obstruction of an officer of the customs or other persons duly employed for the prevention of smuggling, in the exercise of his powers. There is the authority of the judgment of Pandrang Row J. reported in Pattanathan, IN re 1937-1 Mad LJ 178 : (AIR 1937 Mad 208) dealing with the identical section of the Sea Customs Act, wherein the learned Judge observed, on facts closely analogous to those in this case:

(3.) THE second point which also appears from the record is that at the time of the alleged obstruction, the Customs Officers were not in their uniform, nor did they disclose that they were customs officers. It would have been, therefore, quite possible that the driver apprehended that some unknown persons were attempting to stop the car with questionable motives. The section clearly requires that the Customs Officers should be acting in their official capacity. Therefore the offence involves knowledge on the part of the accused or the likelihood of knowledge on the part of the accused that the persons whom they are alleged to have obstructed, were customs officers engaged in the performance of their duties. When the proved facts give no basis for drawing such an inference of intention to obstruct Customs Offices in the mind of the accused, that again would be a factor vitiating the conviction. I therefore set aside the conviction of the appellants and direct that the fine, if paid by them be refunded.