LAWS(MAD)-1964-4-27

KARUPPU UDAYAR Vs. STATE OF MADRAS

Decided On April 15, 1964
KARUPPU UDAYAR Appellant
V/S
STATE OF MADRAS Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal against the judgment of Veeraswami J. rejecting the application filed by the appellant for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Salem, dismissing him from service. The appellant was a permanent karnam of Kamakkapalayam village in Athur Taluk in salem District. On receipt of complaints against him, certain charges were framed by the Revenue divisional Officer, Namakkal, and after an enquiry he was dismissed from service. That order formed the subject matter of W. P. 8 of 1954 in this court. It was found that inasmuch as a second opportunity was not given to the appellant, the order of dismissal was illegal. There upon, the Revenue divisional Officer reinstated the appellant and recommenced the inquiry in regard to the original charges. Four witnesses were examined in support of the charges. Shortly thereafter, Athur Taluk came under the jurisdiction of the Revenue divisional Officer Salem. He after having come to a tentative conclusion that the appellant was guilty of the charges, issued on 17-12-1956 a notice calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The appellant submitted his explanation. Not being satisfied with it, the Revenue Divisional officer, Salem, passed an order dismissing him from service. This was on 13-11957. The appellant took the matter by way of appeal to the Collector and then to the Board of Revenue but without success. A revision petition to the Government was equally futile. He then applied to this Court under art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order of dismissal. Veeraswami J. dismissed that application. Hence this appeal.

(2.) THE only point taken by Mr. V. P. Raman in support of the appeal is that as the revenue Divisional Officer, Salem who passed the order of dismissal, did not conduct the entire enquiry, he had not the advantage of personally watching the demeanour of the witnesses whose evidence had been recorded by the Revenue divisional Officer, Namakkal, and, therefore, the conclusion reached on the basis of such recorded evidence must be held to be vitiated by non-observance of rules of natural justice. This contention proceeds on an assumption which can hardly be accepted as correct. For one thing, it might not always be to the advantage of the person charged that the officer conducting the enquiry should be swayed by the impressions created by the demeanour of witnesses. For example, if the witnesses who gave evidence in support of the charge had created a good impression on the enquiring officer, it would be a matter of disadvantage rather than advantage to the person charged, that his case should be decided on the impressions so gathered. Therefore, if there be a change of the enquiring officer during the trial, it can not be said that it would be in the interests of the person charged that the officer hearing the evidence should deal with the case finally. The question whether the impression gathered from the demeanour of witnesses, will be from the point of view of the person charged, an advantage or disadvantage, depending on the circumstances of each case is one for whom to put forward the appropriate time and ask for a recall of those witnesses. When, as in the present case, the person charged did not require that the new officer conducting the enquiry should recall the witnesses examined by his predecessor, one can reasonably infer that he thought it would be to his disadvantage if they wee recalled. Allowing the succeeding officer to continue the enquiry from the stage it was left by his predecessor, would mean that the person against whom the enquiry was conducted deliberately took the chance of the enquiry being continued from where it was left culminating in his favour. It should not be open to such a person, after the enquiry is over, to complain that the witnesses must have been examined de novo by the officer. In Manaklal v. Dr. Prem Chand, (S) there was an allegation that there was bias in a member of the Tribunal conducting the enquiry against an advocate under the bar Councils Act. No objection was taken by the advocate to the presence of that member in the Tribunal, even though he was aware of the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the bias and of his right to challenge the presence of the member in the tribunal. later, however, the constitution of the tribunal was sought to be challenged on the ground of his bias in one of its members. The supreme Court held that, in the circumstances, there was deliberate waiver on the part of the advocate of the objection to the constitution of the tribunal and he could not be later allowed to raise it. That principle will apply with equal force to the present case, where the appellant did not require the Revenue Divisional officer, Salem, not to continue the enquiry at the stage left by his predecessor but to recall the prosecution witnesses.

(3.) EVEN apart from that, we are of opinion that there can be no infringement of the rules of natural justice for the mere reason that the officer who ultimately decided the case did so on the evidence recorded by his predecessor. Conduct of trial by a succeeding Judge from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor, is recognised by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not unknown in the trial of criminal cases also. It cannot be other wise in departmental enquiries. In matters like the present, where the administrative enquiry is of a quasi judicial nature, what the person in the position of the appellant would be entitled to is that the enquiry should be conducted with due regard to the rules of natural justice. In union of India v. T. R. Varma, (S) the Supreme Court indicated the scope of such rules in their application to departmental enquiries. The following passage in that judgment will be useful (page 885):