SALLIYAL KOTAKKAT MANAKKAL NARAYANAN NAMBUDIRI Vs. PATTICHARAVOOR ALIAS CHARAVOOR MANAKKAL DECEASED NARAYANAN NAMBUDIRIPAD DAUGHTER UNNIMAYYA ANTHARJANAM AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BOTH the Courts have repelled the various defences raised by the first defendant appellant who executed a promissory note Ex. A promising to pay to the plaintiff's father a sum of Rs. 2,500 with interest at six per cent per annum. Several defences were raised. The first is that the promissory note is unenforceable as being one executed for a purpose opposed to public policy. The second is that the amount covered by the promissory note was really intended for the sole benefit of the ninth defendant who is the second wife of the plaintiff's father and that therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to sue. The first point which is really the more important of the two was elaborately discussed at the Bar and Mr. Ramakrishna Ayyar, learned Counsel for the appellant, argues that there is something against public policy in the case of a promise to pay to the bridegroom (the plaintiff's father) some amount in consideration of his marrying the promisor's daughter. The document may be referred to before proceeding with the discussion of the question of law. The material portion of Ex. A runs thus:

(2.) MR . Ramakrishna Aiyar says that though a present made to a bride or bridegroom at the time of the marriage may be valid, a promise to pay in future a particular sum in consideration of the promisee marrying the son or daughter of the promisor is merely in the nature of a promise to make a gift and is therefore unenforceable. He also urges that the transaction is opposed to public policy. He bases his argument on the decisions which have laid down that marriage brocage contracts are opposed to public policy and hence unenforceable. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Venkatakrishnayya v. Lakshminarayana, (1908) 18 M.L.J. 405 :, I.L.R. 32 Mad. 185 and of the Bombay High Court in Dholidas Ishwar v. Fulchand Chagan, I.L.R. (1897) Bom. 658. These decisions really hit at contracts made for the benefit of third parties be they parents of the bride or bridegroom or third parties. A promise to pay such persons some consideration for bringing about a marriage is illegal, particularly in the case of the parents and guardians of the bride or bridegroom whose duty it is to select the best match possible for the daughter or son. If they are allowed to receive some amount as an inducement to give the girl in marriage or to accept a girl in marriage, there will be a conflict between their duty to the son or daughter and their interest to secure a benefit to themselves. Even in such a case when a payment is actually made and the marriage is brought about, the money so paid cannot be recovered. But it has been held that if there is a bare promise to pay some money to the bride's parents or bridegroom's parents not followed up by actual payment, the promise cannot be enforced by the promisee - -as the consideration is opposed to public policy and hence illegal. But these questions are not relevant to a consideration of the enforceability of a promise to settle some property or pay some amount in consideration of his or her marrying the daughter or the son of the promisor. Numerous cases of this kind must have occurred; but there is not a single decision brought to my notice where it has been held that a promise to pay a particular sum of money or to settle some property on a bride or bridegroom in consideration of her or his marrying the son or daughter of the promisor is invalid.

(3.) THE next decision relied on is Venkatakrishnayya v. Lakshminarayana, (1908) 18 M.L.J. 405 :, I.L.R. 32 Mad. 185. The question referred to the Full Bench in the above case was whether a contract to make a payment to the father in consideration of his giving his daughter in marriage is to be regarded as immoral or opposed to public policy within the meaning of Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act. The Full Bench held that such a contract was immoral and opposed to public policy. I have not been referred to any passage in that judgment which has a bearing on the question whether a promise to make a gift in favour of the bridegroom is or is not unenforceable by him. The Full Bench dealt only with a case where it was a promise made to the father to induce him to give the girl in marriage. As pointed out already it is the duty of the father to select the best possible boy and if he is allowed to enforce a contract of the kind in question it would come into conflict with his duty which he owes to the daughter and hence such a contract is opposed to public policy and illegal.