RAGHAVENDRA SWAMI MUTT Vs. PANCHAPAKESA IYER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 19-12-1991 in O. S. No. 992 of 1990 on the file of Subordinate judge, Tiruchirappalli. Learned Subordinate judge dismissed the suit and against the judgment and decree, the plaintiff has preferred this appeal.

(2.) THE averments made in the plaint are that the suit property belongs to the mutt, called Sri Sumatheendra Swami Mutt which is a branch Mutt of Nanjangaud Sri raghavendra Swamy Mutt. There is no dispute that Sri Raghavendra Swamy Mutt is a hindu Mutt as defined under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred o as 'the HR and CE Act') and mutt is camping at Mantralayam in the State of Andhra Pradesh. So far as the Sri sumatheendra Swami Mutt which is a branch Mutt of Sri Raghavendra Swamy mutt is concerned, it is situate at Srirangam and it is public trust and its properties are held in public trust. The suit property is one of the properties held by the plaintiff Mutt and the said property is a public trust property. Since the Matadhipathi of Sri raghavendra Swamy Mutt was at mantralayam and there were vast extent of properties endowed to the plaintiff trust, it is stated that the Matadhipathi of Sri raghavendra Swamy Mutt found it difficult to personally manage the properties and accordingly used to appoint power agents to manage the properties. It is stated that the power agents were appointed under the belief that they would discharge their duties in the best interest of the Mutt, but in certain cases this has not proved to be true. So far as the suit property and other properties which are situated at Srirangam are concerned, the then Matadhipathi of the mutt appointed one S. Srinivasa Rao and krishna Murthy Rao to manage the properties at Srirangam. It is stated that they were neither faithful, nor pious and acted to the detriment of the plaintiff Mutt. It is stated that the plaintiff became aware of the dishonest transactions at the time when the suit was filed. It is further stated that the power agents Srinivasa Rao and Krishna murthy Rao had leased out the suit erly to one C. S. Subba Rao on a perpetual lease by a lease deed dated 16-2-1946 and the deed of lease contains various clauses. According to the plaintiff, the lease is not legally valid as the Matadhipathi has no right to lease out perpetually the properties belonging to the public trust for a period exceeding five years. It is stated that the plaintiff trust should obtain the necessary permission from the Commissioner of Hindu religious and Charitable Endowment Department if the lease exceeds a period of five years and on the facts of the case, no such permission was obtained. It is also stated that there was no necessity for the Mutt to lease out any of its properties on perpetual lease and at that time, the Mutt was getting very good income from the properties endowed to the Mutt and from public contributions like donations to the Mutt. Hundial collections, etc. It is therefore stated that the perpetual lease granted in favour of subba Rao is void ab initio as there was no legal necessity for the grant of perpetual lease. It is stated that the power agents have acted dishonestly and exceeded their powers delegated to them and hence, any arrangement made with the agents would not bind the plaintiff Mutt. It is stated that one of the conditions in the lease deed was that the property as a vacant land should not be alienated, but Subba Rao alienated his right in favour of Krishna Murthy as vacant site who, in turn, alienated in favour of Seetha prabhakara Rao as vacant site. It is stated that Seetha Prabhakara Rao alienated the property in favour of the defendant in the year 1989 as vacant site. It is also stated that all the transactions were made when the property was a vacant site and the transactions were made in gross violation of the lease deed dated 16-2-1946. It is therefore stated that the alienation in favour of the defendant is legally void and the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the suit property. It is further stated that only on 18-11-1990 the plaintiff came to know about the transactions when the present agent of the mutt visited the suit property. It is stated that the defendant has tried to put up a building in the suit property for which he has no right arid the defendant is bound to surrender the suit property to the plaintiff. Hence, the suit has been filed on the ground that the plaintiff is entitled to possession on the basis of its title to the suit property as the alleged deed of lease is void ab initio and the lease is in violation of Section 34 of the H. R. and C. E. Act. It is also stated that it is not open to the defendant to claim adverse possession in view of Section 10 of the limitation Act and Section 109 of the H. R. and C. E. Act and the cause of action arose when the defendant was trying to put up a building in the suit property.

(3.) THE defendant in the written statement denied that the plaintiff is the matadhipathi of the Mutt. He also denied the power of attorney executed in favour of the power agent, Guru Raja Rao who instituted the suit on behalf of the Sri raghavendra Swami Mutt. The main contention of the defendant was that the grant of lease is not detrimental to the plaintiff mutt. It is also stated that the plaintiff has chosen not to question the alienations to others, but singled out the defendant alone and when other lease deeds executed by the power agents have not been questioned, there are no reasons as to why the plaintiff should question the similar perpetual and permanent lease deed executed by the same power agents in favour of the defendant alone and the same power agents cannot be dubbed unfaithful for one transaction and good agent for other transactions. It is also alleged that the suit instituted by the present matadhipathi lacks bona fide and the defendant is the bona fide purchaser for value. It is also stated that the defendant purchased not only the site, but also the building thereon. It is stated that the document dated 16-2-1946 is not really a deed of lease but one of sale. It is also stated that the suit is barred by limitation. It is stated that it is a permanent lease coupled with interest and the parties who have taken under the lease have prescribed titled to that extent. In the additional written statement it is stated that a premium of Rs. 600/- was paid in the year 1946 at the time of entering into the lease. There was one reply statement by the plaintiff and another additional written statement by the defendant and we perused them.