JANAK SINGH Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Great Poet Thiruvalluvar said in Thirukural : THE meaning of this Rural is this : "it would be folly not to fear of what is to be feared. THE truly wise will fear of what is to be feared. " We are reminded of this Kural while dealing with this suo motu contempt petition. Mr. Karuppan, former President of Madras High Court advocates Association, who has put in more than 25 years of practice as an advocate, thinking that he is involving in heroic and courageous acts, has challenged the majesty of law, thereby landing himself in the trouble of facing the contempt proceedings before the Full Bench of this Court. This has got a chequered history which is as follows : " (a) Karuppan, an Advocate of this Court, as a party in-person, claiming himself as a best Rifle shooter, filed various writ petitions and the contempt petition against the Chennai Rifle Club and its office bearers as well as the Government seeking for the direction to the government for vesting the Chennai Rifle Club with the State Government on the ground of various irregularities committed by one Sivanthi Adityan, the secretary of the Chennai Rifle Club, and to permit him to have a training in the Coaching Camp and to participate in the National Rifle Association of India and for other directions. (b) THEse petitions came up before the Division Bench comprising of M. Karpagavinayagam, J. and S. Ashok Kumar, J. During the pendency of those petitions, it was brought to the notice by the lawyer appearing for Sivanthi Adityan that Karuppan distributed pamphlets among lawyers in the High Court premises criticising the judicial functions of the first Bench presided by the Chief Justice and also the Second Bench presided by justice V. S. Sirpurkar who decided earlier on the same issue. On being satisfied that there was a prima facie case, a suo motu contempt was initiated against Karuppan by the Bench and opportunity was given to him to file his explanation and make his submissions. After hearing all the matters, the said division Bench while dismissing all the writ petitions, etc. filed by Karuppan, found him guilty u/s. 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act in the suo motu contempt petition and sentenced him to pay a fine of Re. 1/- to be paid in one month, in default to undergo one day simple imprisonment. THEse orders were passed on 5-12-200 3. (C) Aggrieved over this, Mr. Karuppan, on 9-12-200 3 , filed the petition with an affidavit before the First Bench praying the Chief Justice to post the said matter again before the same Division Bench so that he would argue for recalling the earlier order dated 5-12-200 3 on the ground that the said order was a biased one. THE Hon'ble Chief Justice however posted the matter before another Division Bench comprised of P. D. Dinakaran, J. and F. M. Ibrahim Kalifullah, J. THE matter came up before the said Division Bench on 15-12-200 3. Next day, i. e. on 16-12-200 3 , the matter was heard by the said Bench. THEre, Mr. Karuppan argued that the earlier order dated 5-12-2003 passed by the Division Bench (MKVJ and SAJ) was to be recalled on the ground of bias, as MKVJ and Sivanthi Adithyan are family friends. THE said application was dismissed by the said Bench (PDDJ and FMIKJ)on the same day i. e. 16-12-200 3. However, an observation was made by the said Bench that their order would not prevent the Hon'ble Chief Justice to post it before the same Bench for further orders. (d) Mr. Karuppan presented another letter before the chief Justice with the same request. THE said letter as well as the order by the other Bench dated 16-12-2003 were placed before the Chief Justice on 17-12-2003. THE Hon'ble Chief Justice in response to the said request, directed the Registry to post the matter before the same Division Bench (MKVJ and SAJ)for being mentioned. (e) When the matter came up before the said Division bench comprising of MKVJ and SAJ for being mentioned, Mr. Karuppan quoting various reasons for the said Division Bench to recuse itself as the Division bench headed by Justice M. Karpagavinayagam is a close family friend of sivanthi Adityan, asked the Bench to set aside its own order and refer to another Bench for fresh hearing. (f) While hearing, he read over the various allegations against the Judge of the Division Bench contained in the affidavit dated 9-12-2003 and his letter dated 15-12-2003 placed before the Division Bench. THE said Division Bench through an elaborate order dated 24-12-2003 rejected his request. While so, the said Division Bench, in the light of the scurrilous averments made against the Judges contained in the affidavit dated 9-12-2003 and the letter dated 15-12-2003, placed before the Bench, issued suo motu contempt notice against Mr. Karuppan. THE Division Bench also ordered notice to the Advocate General and to the Presidents of Bar Association and Advocates' association to assist the Court. Since it was noticed that whenever Mr. Karuppan gets unfavourable orders from the Judges, he invariably used to criticise them, the Division Bench felt that the matter may be heard by an appropriate larger Bench in the light of the issue involved, the same was directed to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for passing appropriate orders. Accordingly, as suggested by the Division Bench, the Hon'ble Chief justice constituted this Full Bench comprising of MKVJ, FMIKJ and SAJ to hear and dispose of the suo motu contempt matter. That was how the matter was posted before us. (g) THE matter came up for the first hearing before this bench on 23-1-2004. Even at the threshold, the Full Bench advised Karuppan that it would not be proper for him to take a tirade against the Judges who do not pass orders in his favour and he must realise his mistakes and it would be better for him to file a suitable statement as this Bench was not really interested in taking serious contempt action against him as he is a former president of the Advocates'Association. Mr. R. Gandhi, President of Bar Association also requested this Court to give some more time to enable Karuppan to think over the situation and to realise his past mistakes and to file a suitable affidavit. He further stated that he would also advise Karuppan to behave properly in the Courts in future. Mr. Karuppan on that day agreed to think over the same and requested this Court to give some time so that he would decide the issue and file his appropriate statement. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned. (h) When the matter came up again on 12-3-2004, Mr. Karuppan instead of realising his mistake and filing a suitable statement, raised an objection regarding the jurisdiction under Section 14 (2) of the contempt of Courts Act and requested to refer to some other Bench. When we declined his request, he wanted some time to file his detailed statement. Since he said that he would file comprehensive counter-affidavit raising the point of jurisdiction as well as giving explanation to the show cause notice, this Bench granted further time and adjourned accordingly. (i) THE matter came up on the next adjourned date. Mr. Karuppan filed a detailed affidavit. While mentioning so many reasons in justification of his act, he insisted that this Full Bench shall refer the matter before some other Bench under Section 14 (2) of the Act. At this point of time, this Court clarified as indicated by the Advocate General that this Full bench was specially constituted by the Chief Justice and so Section 14 (2) would not apply. He insisted for a written order on this aspect. When he was questioned by this Bench as to his stand with reference to the show cause notice, he emphatically stated that he has not committed contempt; he is pleading not guilty and has no regret for his conduct. As requested by Mr. Karuppan, this Bench passed the written order rejecting his contention in respect of Section 14 (2) of the Act on the reason that Section 14 (2) would not apply as this is the Full Bench specially constituted by the Hon'ble Chief justice. In the said order, the plea of'not guilty'also was recorded. He wanted further time to file his additional affidavit. Accordingly, further time was granted and the matter was adjourned. (j) THEn, the matter again came up on 26-3-2004. He filed another affidavit mainly raising the point of jurisdiction on the basis of section 14 (2) of the Act. THEn, he was asked to argue on the basis of the two affidavits filed on two different dates, i. e. 19-3-2004 and 26-3-2004. He argued at length. " THE gist of his arguments is as follows : " (A) THE Bench which issued show cause notice in the contempt petition cannot decide the matter and therefore, it is mandatory under section 14 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act to place it before the Chief justice for posting it before some other Bench. (B) THE order was pronounced on 5-12-2003. THE same was issued only on 8-12-2003. Karuppan therefore felt that the judgment had suffered corrections. THEre was reasonable apprehension that certain remarks praising Sivanthi Adityan had been deleted in the course of correction. Though he was absent on that day, he heard about the happenings from the members of the Bar. He said in good faith. Obviously his endeavour was only to say that justice was not seemingly done. (C) Justice Karpagavinayagam had made some defamatory and untrue remarks about Karuppan's Presidentship of Advocates Association in the earlier order. THE Division Bench while issuing show cause notice also issued notice to the Presidents of Advocates Association and Bar Association. THEy have no say in the contempt petition in view of the decisions in Advocate general of Tamil Nadu v. Krishnaraju I. L. R. (1981) 2 Mad 246 : (1981 Cri LJ 250) and Baradakanta v. G. Mishra AIR 1974 SC 2255 : (1975 Cri LJ 1 ). (D) In yet another matter, revision against acquittal of murder case, Justice Karpagavinayagam while passing final order made an elaborate disparaging remark about advocacy of Mr. Karuppan. So, Mr. Karuppan has developed some grouse against the Judge. Further grouse against Karpagavinayagam, j.'s Bench is that it failed to consider his submissions and the G. O. produced by the Advocate General in the writ petitions. It did not consider his additional affidavit in support of his plea for recalling of the order. (E) THE Division Bench comprising Justice M. Karpagavinayagam and another had committed contempt of the Supreme Court's order dated 6-3-2003 by hearing the writ petitions, etc. in piecemeal on a weekly basis for months together and disposed belatedly i. e. on 5-12-2003 even though the Supreme Court directed the High Court to dispose of the same expeditiously. (F) THE earlier suo motu contempt proceedings were conducted in the Chamber in camera. This is not permissible under law. THE contempt power is vested with the Chief Justice alone. THErefore, the Division bench cannot initiate proceedings of the criminal contempt. So, the order of conviction for contempt is wrong. (G) While hearing the main writ petitions, a G. O. Copy was produced by the Advocate General. That was not considered by the Division bench. Further, when the application for recalling the order was filed and the same was argued, an additional affidavit of Karuppan also was placed before the division Bench and the said additional affidavit was not considered by the said division Bench. (H) Ibrahim Kalifullah, J. , one of the Judges of this full Bench, earlier convicted Karuppan and imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/- as costs while sitting with Justice V. S. Sirpurkar in the Division Bench. Further, Kalifullah, J. sitting in the Full Bench wanted to hurry up the matter and showed anxiety to dispose of the matter even without the counter-affidavit. This does not infuse confidence in Justice Ibrahim Kalifullah. (I) A similar letter was placed before the other Bench comprising of PDDJ and FMIKJ. Some of the portions criticising Justice karpagavinayagam and Justice Ashok Kumar were deleted in the course of the hearing as per the orders passed by the Division Bench on 16-12-2003. In that bench, Ibrahim Kalifullah, J. was one of the Judges. That order was not served on Karuppan. Without service of that order, the matter came up before the division Bench comprising MKVJ and SAJ. Now, MKVJ and SAJ issued notice for the letter and the affidavit, even though some portions have been expunged by the other Bench. So issuance of show cause notice for the expunged portions of contumacious averments is not legal. (J) He has not committed any contempt. He is pleading not guilty and he has no regret for his conduct. If only the matter is posted before some other Bench, he could elaborately argue on the above points with out any embarrassment. " We have heard the Advocate General in regard to the point of jurisdiction. THE gist of his submissions is as follows : "section 14 (2) of the Act will not apply to the present case as the cognizance by this Court has been taken under Section 15 of the Act. Even assuming that Section 14 (2) would apply, in this case, the division Bench which issued contempt notice requested the Chief Justice to constitute the appropriate Bench and then, the Hon'ble Chief Justice has been pleased to post it before a Full Bench specially constituted and as such, this full Bench has got every right to hear the matter and it is prerogative for the chief Justice to post a particular matter before a particular Bench and the contemner or litigant has no right to claim that a particular Bench should not hear the matter. He would cite several authorities". We have carefully considered the submissions made by Mr. Karuppan, the contemner as well as the Advocate General. At the outset, it shall be recalled that when this matter came up for hearing on 23-1-2004, the Full Bench advised Mr. Karuppan that his conduct of going on criticising Judges and making allegations against each one of the Judges who does not pass orders in his favour, would not be a befitting one for an experienced lawyer and so, he must realise his mistake and then file a suitable statement before this Court so that this Full Bench will consider the same for dropping further action on this matter. On that day, Mr. Karuppan represented that he would think over the issue as advised by the Full Bench and take a decision and then file a suitable affidavit in the next hearing. Further, as stated above. Mr. R. Gandhi, the President of the Bar Association requested this Court to adjourn the matter so that he also would advise Mr. Karuppan to realise his mistake and make him file undertaking affidavit that he would behave properly in the Courts in future. On the basis of these statements made by Mr. Karuppan and Mr. R. Gandhi, the senior counsel, the Bar Association president, the matter was adjourned. On this day, we were on the hope that Mr. Karuppan would file his statement after realising his mistake as per the advice of the Full bench as well as the advice of Mr. R. Gandhi, Bar Association President. When the matter again came up on 12-3-2004, to our surprise, Mr. Karuppan without touching the said subject, raised a question of jurisdiction before this Court stating that under Section 14 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter and the same shall be tried by some other bench. He would also request the Full Bench to seek for the view of the Advocate general on the same day. THE Advocate General, who was present on that day, on our request, clarified the position that Section 14 (2) of the Act would not apply as it is concerned with the contempt committed in the presence of the Court and in pursuance of the same, the person to be detained in custody at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day. According to the Advocate general, the cognizance in this case has been taken and notice has been issued under Section 15. THErefore, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. In the light of this view by the Advocate General, Mr. Karuppan requested this bench to give some more time to file his statement giving explanation and raising the other legal issues. Accordingly, further time was granted upto 19-3-2004. THErefore, the meaning of the expression "good faith" is what is done with "due care and attention". Due care denotes the degree of reasonableness in the care sought to be exercised. So, before a person proposes to make an imputation, he must first make an enquiry into the factum of the imputation which he proposes to make. It is not enough that he does just a make-believe show for an enquiry. THE enquiry expected of him is of such a depth as a reasonable and prudent man would make with the genuine intention in knowing the real truth of the imputation. If he does not do so he cannot claim that what he did was bona fide i. e. done in good faith. Thus, a contemner, if he is to establish "good faith" has to say that he conducted a reasonable and proper enquiry before making an imputation. This is the meaning and interpretation given for the expression "good faith" by the Apex Court in AIR 2001 SC 2374. In his affidavit, Mr. Karuppan did not mention that he took care to enquire about what happened in the Court when the final order was pronounced and he has not given clear details in the affidavit whether he has made such an enquiry and from whom, he got the information, and whether such information is authentic or not so the plea of good faith is to be rejected as the same smacks of utter lack of bona fides. Under those circumstances, this Court has no other alternative except to conclude that the contemner has not offered acceptable explanation with reference to the charge made in the show cause notice. While noting that it is highly painful to convict Mr. Karuppan, who is a lawyer for about 25 years practising in this Court, for contempt, as it pleases none, this Full Bench is conscious of the fact that this is a special Full Bench which has been constituted by the Hon'ble Chief justice for this purpose. As a matter of fact, on some occasions on the hearing dates, we expressed our reluctance to convict him and to impose consequent punishment. Without understanding our reluctance in the right spirit, Mr. Karuppan had emboldened to say that this Bench need not treat him differently merely because he is an advocate and this Court in the event of coming to conclusion that he committed contempt could straightway send him to jail. THE statement made by him in the open Court challenging this Bench to send him to jail would disclose his unrepentant attitude in the matter. He has no regrets for his utterances. When that being the attitude, it becomes the duty of this bench to start the cause of taking" action for contempt mainly for preserving its dignity. No one including an advocate who himself is an officer of the Court can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his conduct in relation to the Court interferes with or is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. Whoever the person may be, however high he may be, no one is above the law notwithstanding how powerful and how rich he may be. For achieving the establishment of the rule of law, the Constitution has assigned the special task to the judiciary in the country. It is only through the Courts that the rule of law unfolds its contents and establishes its concept. For the judiciary to perform its duties and functions effectively and true to the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the Courts have to be respected and protected at all costs. Scandalising the Court would mean hostile criticism of judges or judiciary. Any personal attack upon a Judge in connection with the office he holds is dealt with under law of libel slander. Yet defamatory publication concerning the Judge as a Judge brings the Court or Judges into contempt serious impediment to justice and an inroad on the majesty of justice. Any caricature of a Judge calculated to lower the dignity of the Court would destroy, undermine or tend to undermine public confidence in the administration of justice or the majesty of justice. It would, therefore be scandalising the judge as a Judge. In other words, imputing partiality, bias, improper motives to a Judge is scandalisation of the Court and would be contempt of the Court. Even imputation of lack of impartiality or fairness to a Judge in the discharge of his official duties amounts to contempt. THE gravamen of the offence is that of lowering his dignity or authority or an affront to majesty of justice. When the contemner challenges the authority of the Court, he interferes with the performance of duties of Judge's office or judicial process or administration of justice or generation or production of tendency bringing the Judge or judiciary into contempt. THE strains of litigation cannot be allowed to lead litigations to tarnish, terrorise and destroy the system of administration of justice by vilification of Judges. It is not that Judges need be protected; judges may well take care of themselves. It is the right and interest of the public in the due administration of justice that has to be protected. As observed by the Supreme Court, the tendency of maligning the reputation of judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail to secure the desired order is ever on the increase. It is high time it is nipped in the bud. When a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. Veiled threats, abrasive behaviour, use of disrespectful language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks are often designedly employed with a view to taming a Judge into submission to secure a desired order. Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of not only the concerned Judge but the entire institution. It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislative but also from those who are an integral part of the system. THE stand taken by the contemner is that he was performing his duty as an outspoken and fearless member of the Bar. He seems to be labouring under a grave misunderstanding. Braveness is not outspokenness. Arrogance is not fearlessness. Humility and courtesy are the basic qualities of a lawyer. Humility is not servility and courtesy is not lack of dignity. Self-restraint and respectful attitude towards the Court are the requisites of good advocacy. A lawyer has to be gentleman first. His most valuable asset is the respect and goodwill he enjoys among his colleagues and in the Court. THEse are all the golden words observed by the Supreme Court in In Re : Vinay Chandra mishra, (1955) 2 SCC 584 : (1995 Cri LJ 3994 ). Justice Ahmadi in M. B. Singh v. High Court of Punjab and haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1834 : (1991 Cri LJ 2648) observed thus : "when a member of the profession resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When there is a deliberate attempt to scandalise which would shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system, the damage caused is not only to the reputation of the concerned Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . It is high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial independence has to be protected not only from the executive or the legislative but also from those who are an integral part of the system. " Justice Krishna Iyer In Re : S. Mulgaokar, AIR 1978 SC 727 stated thus : "if the Court considers the attack on the Judge or judges scurrilous, offensive, intimidatory or malicious beyond condonable limits, the strong arm of the law must, in the name of public interest and public justice, strike a blow on him who challenges the supremacy of the rule of law by fouling its source and stream. " Patanjali Sastri, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, heading the Constitution Bench, in Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. AIR 1954 SC 10 : 1954 Cri LJ 238 would observe as follows : "if the publication of disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It would be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the mind of the public regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigant from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice. " From the above judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court, it is manifestly clear that the strong arm of the law, in the name of public interest and public justice, has to necessarily strike a blow on the contemner, in order to preserve dignity of the Court and no one including an advocate can claim immunity from the operation of the law of contempt, if his act or conduct is calculated to obstruct the due course of justice. As discussed in the above paragraphs, we conclude that the contemner has, made scurrilous, offensive allegations against the Judges of this Court. THErefore, we find the contemner guilty of the criminal contempt of court under Section 2 (c) and convict him of the said offence. While awarding punishment, this Court has to necessarily keep in view the gravity of the act of contempt, committed by the contemner. Further, the past conduct also has to be taken into account while imposing punishment. As mentioned in the earlier order. Mr. Karuppan while arguing the matter before the Second Bench presided by V. S. Sirpurkar, he criticized the order of the Supreme Court and the Second Bench and instead of taking contempt action, the Second Bench imposed costs of Rs. 2,000/ -. THE said order was challenged before the Supreme Court and the same was dismissed. When he sought for deletion of costs of Rs. 2,000/- the Supreme Court directed him to approach the same Bench for modification of the same. However, the contemner has not chosen either to approach the said Bench for modification or to pay the amount. In the last suo motu contempt initiated by the Division bench, we did not incline to impose severe punishment. In that case, Mr. Karuppan was found guilty under S. 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Re. 1/- to be paid in one month. This order was passed on 5-12-2003. Four months have elapsed. If is noticed that that one rupee has not been paid till date. It is also relevant to note that several contempt proceedings have been initiated against Mr. Karuppan on various occasions by several Benches of this Court and the same are pending disposal. On verification with the Registry, Justice S. Subramani (as he then was) initiated contempt proceedings in Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 33 of 1998 on 6-1-1998 and a Full Bench was constituted to be presided by N. Dhinakar, J. on 3-8-2001 and the same is pending. In another Suo Motu Contempt No. 301 of 2001, the second Bench presided by K. Narayana Kurup, J. (as he then was) initiated contempt proceedings on 15-6-2001. Similarly, another suo motu contempt was initiated in No. 310 of 2001 and both the matters have been posted before the full Bench presided by V. S. Sirpurkar, J. and they are still pending. Thus, it is clear that it has become a routine practice to misbehave before the Court with the false prestige that nobody could touch him. This is unfortunate situation. In such circumstances, we are to impose a sentence directing him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. Before parting with this case, this Bench would constrain to exercise one more duty. THE Supreme Court while dealing with a similar situation, as reported in (1998) 4 SCC 409 : (AIR 1998 SC 1895) (Constitution bench) would stress the necessity for not only convicting the lawyer for contempt of Court but also to refer the misconduct of the advocate to the Bar council to take appropriate action. THE following are the guidelines and observations given to the High Courts and the Bar Council of India and Bar Councils of States : (1) An Advocate, who is found guilty of contempt of court, may also, as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct in a given case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India, to punish that advocate by either debarring him from practice or suspending his licence, as may be warranted, in the facts and circumstances of each case. (2) We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be, when apprised of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate by the High Court or by this court, would rise to the occasion, and take appropriate action against such an advocate. THErefore, the Bar Council must, whenever facts warrant, rise to the occasion and discharge its duties, uninfluenced by the position of the contemner advocate. (3) THE High Courts also have to draw the attention of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct of a contemner advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed in the manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. THEre is no justification to assume that the Bar Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the Courts and the majesty of law and prevent any interference in the administration of justice. (4) Whenever a Court of record records its findings about the conduct of an advocate while finding him guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or refers the matter to be considered by the Bar Council concerned in accordance with law with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and to uphold the majesty of law and professional standards and etiquette. In the light of the above mandates, this Full Bench feels that this is a fit case where there shall be a reference of the matter to be considered by the State Bar Council to take appropriate action against the contemner in accordance with law, as, in our view, he had abused his professional privileges while practising as an advocate and the conduct of the contemner is highly contumacious and unpardonable and accordingly, ordered. THE registry is directed to send a copy of this order forthwith to the State Bar council for taking appropriate action by following the required procedure. While concluding, this Full Bench has to place on record its full appreciation for the services rendered by the Advocate General, and the President of the Bar Association. 61. With these observations, the suo motu contempt petition is disposed of. SUO MOTU CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 1134 of 2003 P. M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. :- I had the privilege to go through the orders of my learned Brother Justice M. Karpagavinayagam and I fully concur with the views expressed therein, as well as, the conclusions in all respects. However, I wish to add that in the course of hearing of the above contempt petition, we made earnest efforts to make Mr. Karuppan understand his folly in his attempts of tarnishing the image of this great institution by throwing unfounded and baseless allegations against the Presiding Judges. In fact, we were never interested in punishing Mr. Karuppan, rather we only thought that senior counsel would prevail upon him and he would mend his ways. But unfortunately, all our efforts did not yield the desired results. But we only found in Mr. Karuppan his uncontrolled desire to further tarnish the image of this esteemed institution. In such circumstances, since in spite of several opportunities extended to him, he refused to mend his ways and persistently attempted to justify his contumacious conduct, we had no other option except to pass these orders convicting him for the contempt found proved against him. I hereby fully endorse the views and conclusions expressed in the orders pronounced by us. SUO MOTH CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 1134 OF 2003 S. ASHOK KUMAR, J. :- I fully agree with the views and decisions expressed by my learned Brothers M. Karpagavinayagam, J. and F. M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. , Mr. Karuppan, former President of the Madras High Court, advocates Association should have been a role model for others, especially juniors, but has voluntarily invited such contempt proceedings by his adamant behaviour. This Bench wanted to give him several opportunities to repent. But, all the attempts of this Bench to make him feel sorry of his earlier behaviours became futile. In AIR 1954 SC 10 : (1984 Cri LJ 239) (Brahma Prakash v. State of U. P.), a Five-Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- "a defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court's administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. " In (1996) 5 SCC 216 : (1996 Cri LJ 3274) (Dr. D. C. Saxena v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India), a three-Judge Bench of the hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows :- "if maintenance of democracy is the foundation for free speech, society equally is entitled to regulate freedom of speech or expression by democratic action. Liberty of speech and expression guaranteed by art. 19 (1) (a) brings within its ambit, the corresponding duty and responsibility and puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty. THE State has legitimate interest, therefore, to regulate the freedom of speech and expression which liberty represents the limits of the duty of restraint on speech or expression. THEre is a correlative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. Each is entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has a right to denigrate others'right to person or reputation. THErefore, freedom of speech and expression is to be tolerated so long as it is not malicious or libellous, not that all attempts to foster and ensure orderly and peaceful public discussion or public good should result from free speech in the market place. If such speech or expression was untrue and so reckless as to its truth, the speaker or the author does not get protection of the constitutional right. Freedom of speech and expression, therefore, would be subject to Arts. 19 (2 ). 129 and 215 of the Constitution, in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence etc. it may, therefore, be subject to certain restrictions but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary for the respect of life and reputations of others for the protection of national security or public order or of public health or morale. Thus liberty of speech and expression guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (a) carries within its ambit a corresponding duty and responsibility which puts limitations on the exercise of that liberty. " "advocate touches and asserts the primary value of freedom, of expression. It is a practical manifestation of the principle of freedom of speech. Freedom of expression in arguments encourages the development of judicial dignity, forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity, equality and justice, it plays its part in helping to secure the protection of other fundamental human rights. Freedom of expression, therefore, is one of the basic conditions for the progress of advocacy and for the development of every man including legal fraternity practising the profession of law. Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of free society. It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the citizens. THE advocate or the party appearing in person, therefore, is given liberty of expression. But they equally owe countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in the Court proceedings or judicial process. THE liberty of free expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to make unfounded allegations against any institution, much less the judiciary. " THE punishment for contempt, therefore, is not for the purpose of protecting or vindicating either the dignity of the Court as a whole or an individual Judge of the Court from attack on his personal reputation but it is intended to protect the public who are subject to the jurisdiction of the court and to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice. If the authority of the Court remains undermined or impeded the fountain of justice gets sullied creating distrust and disbelief in the mind of the litigant public or the right thinking public at large for the benefit of the people. Independence of the judiciary for the due course of administration of justice must be protected and remain unimpaired. Scandalising the Court, therefore, is a convenient expression of scurrilous attack on the majesty of justice calculated to undermine its authority and public confidence in the administration of justice. " THE petitioner continues to commit contempt after contempt in spite of several Opportunities granted to him to change his attitude. THE majesty of law and supremacy of judiciary cannot be undermined by anybody, howsoever high, he may be. THErefore, though it is painful, we are left with no other option but to convict the petitioner for the offence of contempt of court. Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. . . . . . of 2004. M. KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, F. M. IBRAHIM KALIFULLAH AND S. ASHOK KUMAR, JJ. :- Today, we have disposed of Suo Motu Contempt Petition No. 1134 of 2004. In the contempt petition, after receipt of the show cause notice, the contemner has filed two affidavits dated 19-3-2002 and 26-3-2004. In the said affidavits, he further made allegations against the Judges of this Full bench which are as follows : (1) THE Division Bench comprising Justice M. Karpagavinayagam had committed contempt of the Supreme Court order in piecemeal hearing on a weekly basis for months despite the direction of he Supreme Court for expeditious disposal of the same in S. L. P. Civil Nos. 4501 and 4502 of 2003 dated 6-3-2003. (2) THE composition of the Bench to hear the fresh contempt are Judges who have convicted him all with regard to the same subject-matter as between the same parties. (3) Justice F. M. Ibrahim Kalifullah who had convicted him for 2000/- rupees costs almost four times the fine imposed for criminal contempt has been directed to hear this case also is not in accordance with the basic tenet of jurisprudence namely justice should be seemingly done. It is incumbent on the learned Judge to recuse himself. While so, Justice F. M. Ibrahim kalifullah observing that this contempt case should be proceeded with immediately in the last hearing, even in the absence of counter-affidavit does not infuse confidence. (4) Justice M. Karpagavinayagam had imposed costs of Rs. 10,000/- on one lawyer Deivasigamani and Mr. O. Venkatachalam and in another case, he imposed astronomical costs of Rs. 2,00,000. In the said case also, he had imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/- by convicting under S. 2 (b) sitting singly. Recently, he has awarded costs on another lawyer viz. Felix. Similarly, he initiated proceedings against the then City Public Prosecutor and the learned district Judge who is a sitting Judge of the Madras High Court now. Above all, sitting as single Judge, he has convicted a person for criminal contempt, whereas the power to initiate action for criminal contempt is only vested with the Chief Justice Bench or at his instance another Division Bench. (5) He is of the opinion that the learned Judge has passed several orders which have created a sensation in the legal world and that they were wholly without jurisdiction. (6) He has already had a grouse against Justice M. Karpagavinayagam's Bench in as much as they had failed to consider and dealt with his submissions and did not refer to almost 100 authorities cited by him. He also has a grouse that bald findings have been rendered without any basis. THE other grouse is that they were not referring to the additional affidavit filed in support of the recalling of the order. THE order dismissing all the writ petitions was pronounced on 5-12-2003 but was issued on 8-12-2003. He therefore felt that the judgment suffered corrections and the same cannot be done Once the orders are pronounced. THEre was reasonable apprehension that certain remarks praising Sivanthi Adityan had been deleted in the course of corrections. THE above allegations would amount to criticising the method of functioning and attributing motive against the Judges while passing the earlier orders. Mr. Karuppan virtually has made an allegation against justice F. M. Ibrahim Kalifullah that he wanted to hurry up the matter and he was the Judge who already convicted Karuppan in other case and imposed a fine of Rs. 2,000/ -. Factually, it is wrong. As already referred to, when the matter came up before the Second Bench consisting of V. S. Sirpurkar and F. M. Ibrahim kalifullah, JJ. , Mr. Karuppan criticised the order of the Supreme Court and in that situation, costs of Rs. 2,000/- was imposed upon him. This is not a conviction. THEre is a difference between conviction and sentencing fine and imposition of costs. Karuppan has mentioned in para 4 of the affidavit that justice F. M. Ibrahim Kalifullah had convicted him for Rs. 2000/- almost four times the fine imposed for criminal contempt. This is factually wrong. Moreover, the maximum fine amount is not Rs. 500/- as he stated, but Rs. 2,000/ -. Similarly, Justice M. Karpagavinayagam has been criticized stating that the earlier order passed in which he appeared was not a correct order. He has also criticised about the other orders passed by Justice m. Karpagavinayagam in other matters stating that those orders have created a sensation in the legal world and that they are without jurisdiction. This is highly unwarranted allegation against the sitting Judge. Similarly, he cannot criticise the Judge for disposing of the other contempt matters and imposing costs on the parties. In view of the above, this Court is again constrained to issue fresh contempt notice against the contemner. THErefore, office is directed to issue contempt notice to Mr. Karuppan. In this case also, it would be proper to issue notice to the Advocate General, the President of the advocates Association and the President of the Bar Association to give assistance to the Court. Place the matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for posting the same before an appropriate Bench to deal with the contempt. Today, after the pronouncement of the order, Mr. Karuppan would submit that he would pay the fine amount of Rs. 1,000/- on or before 19-4-2004 and requested this Court to suspend the sentence of imprisonment for 8 weeks to enable him to file an appeal before the Supreme Court. In view of the said undertaking, Mr. Karuppan is directed to pay the fine of Rs. 1,000/-on 19-4-2004 to the Registrar General, High Court, Madras. Hence, sentence of imprisonment alone is suspended for eight weeks subject to the condition that he pays the fine amount of Rs. 1,000/- by 19-4-2004. Ordered accordingly. .