V NATARAJAN Vs. SALIYUR MAHAJANA SANGAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE above revision petition is filed by the tenant questioning the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Sub Judge, Chidambaram, in the judgment dated 14.11.2003 in R.C.A.No. 11/2002, confirming the eviction order passed by the learned Rent Controller- cum -District Munsif, Chidambaram, in the order dated 31.7.2002 passed in R.C.O.P.No. 3/1994.

(2.) IT is not in dispute that the respondent-sangam is the landlord and the petitioner is the tenant. The respondent/landlord filed the petition for eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the premises in question, under Sec.14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter called 'the Act'. The same was contested by the petitioner/tenant stating that the respondent/landlord is a religious and charitable institution and the Rent Control Court cannot entertain the eviction petition and so the petitioner/landlord before the learned Rent Controller has to file a civil suit to evict the petitioner/tenant.

(3.) IN view of the factual finding given even by the learned appellate authority that the respondent/landlord is a public trust on the basis of the evidence given on behalf of the respondent/landlord, the case has to be dealt with only on the basis of the said fact. As stated already, public trusts are exempted under the Government Order dated 16.8.1976 passed in G.O.Ms. No. 2000, Home Department, from the purview of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. That means for getting eviction, they need not approach the Rent Control Court but they can approach the Civil Court. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent/landlord, the said Government Order exempting the provisions to the public trust was issued only for the benefit of the landlords. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord also submitted that though such a benefit is conferred on the landlord, it is for the landlord to waive that benefit and approach the original authority ignoring the exemption. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in AIR 1971 S.C. 2213 (supra) in which it is held as follows :- '. 5. According to the preamble on the cessation of the applicability of sub-rule 81 of the Defence of INdia Rules after September 30, 1946 it was considered expedient owing to the shortage of accommodation in the State of Uttar Pradesh to provide for the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the letting and the rent of accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom. Section 3 imposed restrictions on eviction. No suit could be filed in any Civil Court against the tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1) of that Section without the permission of the District Magistrate or of the Commissioner to whom a revision lay against the order of the District Magistrate. Section 5 contained provisions relating to control of rent. The other provisions of the Act need not be noticed. It has never been disputed that the Act was enacted for affording protection to the tenants against eviction except in the manner provided by the Act. It was also mean to regulate the letting of accommodation, fixing of rent, etc., the provisions relating to which were all intended to confer benefits on the tenants against unreasonable and capricious demands of the landlords. At the same time it appears that the legislature was conscious of the fact that the Act might retard and slacken the pace of construction of new buildings because the landlords would naturally be reluctant to invest money in properties the letting of which would be governed by the stringent provisions of the Act. It was for that purpose that the saving provisiosn in S.1-A seems to have been inserted. The essential question that has to be resolved is whether S.1-A was merely in the nature of an exemption in favour of the landlords with regard to the buildings constructed after January 1, 1951 and conferred a benefit on them which they could give up or waive by the agreement or contractual arrangement and whether the consideration or object of such an agreement would not be lawful within the meaning of S.23 of the INdian Contract Act. 6. The general principle is that every one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing way pubic right or public policy. Thus the maxim which sanctions the non-observance of the statutory provision is cuilibet licet renuntiare juri pro se introducto. (See Maxwell on INterpretation of Statutes , Eleventh Edition, pages 375 & 376). If there is any express prohibition against contracting out of a statute in it then no question can arise of any one entering into a contract which is so prohibited but where there is no such prohibition it will have to be seen whether an Act is intended to have a more extensive operation as a matter of public policy. IN Halsbury's Laws of England , Volume 8, Third Edition, it is stated in paragraph 248 at page 143: 'As a general rule, any person can enter into a binding contract to waive the benefits conferred upon him by an Act of Parliament, or, as it is said, can contract himself out of the Act, unless it can be shown that such an agreement is in the circumstances of the particular case contrary to public policy. Statutory conditions may, however, be imposed in such terms that they cannot be waived by agreement, and, in certain circumstances, the legislature has expressly provided that any such agreement shall be void'. IN the footnote it is pointed out that there are many statutory provisions expressed to apply 'notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary', and also a stipulation by which a lessee is deprived of his right to apply for relief against forfeiture for breach of covenant (Law of Property Act, 1925). Section 23 of the INdian Contract Act provides :'The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless 'it is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law or is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to the person or property of another or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. IN each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void.'It has never been the case of the respondent that the consideration or object of the agreement which was entered into in June 1963 was forbidden by law. Reliance has been placed mainly on the next part of the section, namely, that it is of such a nature that it would defeat the provision of any law and in the present case it would be S.1-A of the Act.